United States v. Daniel Joe Chischilly
30 F.3d 1144, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 289, 94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5631 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the standard set in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, novel scientific evidence such as DNA profiling is admissible if its underlying methodology is scientifically valid. Objections to the application of the methodology in a specific case or debates within the scientific community generally go to the weight of the evidence for the jury to consider, not its admissibility.
Facts:
- On January 1, 1990, Daniel Chischilly, a Navajo Indian, reported to a fire station that a woman was hurt beside a road on a Navajo reservation.
- Chischilly led paramedics to Sheila Tso, who was found half-naked and pulseless. She was pronounced dead at the hospital.
- An autopsy concluded Tso died from multiple injuries and hypothermia after being struck from behind by a vehicle with great force.
- At the scene, Chischilly gave conflicting accounts of how he found the body, first claiming he was on foot and later admitting he was driving his pickup truck.
- Physical evidence, including grill shards and tire tracks at the scene, matched Chischilly’s truck. The tire tracks suggested the truck had made a U-turn just before the point of impact.
- After being arrested, Chischilly initially invoked his right to an attorney when approached by an FBI agent.
- Ten days later, on January 11, 1990, an FBI agent revisited Chischilly in jail. After being read his Miranda rights again, Chischilly signed a form consenting to provide a blood sample.
- Subsequent FBI analysis established a match between the DNA from Chischilly's blood sample and semen found on the victim’s clothing.
Procedural Posture:
- Daniel Chischilly was charged with aggravated sexual abuse and murder in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
- Prior to trial, Chischilly filed a motion for the judge to recuse himself due to a prior competency ruling involving Chischilly when the judge was on a state court; the motion was denied.
- The district court held a competency hearing and found Chischilly competent to stand trial.
- Chischilly moved to suppress the blood sample evidence, arguing his consent was not voluntary; the district court denied the motion.
- Chischilly filed a motion in limine to exclude DNA profiling evidence, which the district court denied after an extensive evidentiary hearing.
- A jury convicted Chischilly on both counts.
- The district court sentenced Chischilly to two concurrent life sentences.
- Chischilly appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a district court abuse its discretion by admitting DNA profiling evidence, including statistical probability analysis, when there is ongoing scientific controversy regarding the specific laboratory procedures and statistical calculations used?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Choy
No, the district court did not abuse its discretion. The admission of DNA profiling evidence is proper under the Daubert standard, which requires the trial judge to ensure that scientific testimony is both relevant and reliable, even if the methodology is subject to scientific debate. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert replaced the stricter Frye 'general acceptance' test with a more flexible standard under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. This standard assesses reliability based on factors including testability, peer review, error rates, and general acceptance, with the focus being on the scientific methodology rather than the conclusions. Chischilly's challenges to the FBI's laboratory procedures (such as potential contamination and subjective match criteria) and statistical calculations (such as the use of the product rule in a substructured population) were issues of weight and credibility for the jury to determine, not grounds for exclusion. The court found that 'vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof' are the proper means to challenge 'shaky but admissible evidence.' Finally, under Rule 403, the evidence's significant probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, especially since the prosecution properly framed the statistics as a 'random match probability' rather than a 'source probability,' and the defense had a full opportunity to contest the evidence.
Dissenting - Judge Noonan
The dissent does not address the issue of DNA evidence admissibility. Instead, it argues that the trial judge should have recused himself, and thus the conviction should be overturned. The dissent's reasoning is that under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must disqualify himself if his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Here, the trial judge, while previously a state court judge, had found Chischilly incompetent to stand trial on similar charges years earlier. The dissent argues that a reasonable person would conclude that the judge would face psychological and moral pressure—either to reaffirm his original finding or to avoid releasing a person who had subsequently committed more crimes. This potential for bias, stemming from an extrajudicial source (his prior work as a state judge), created a situation where the judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned, mandating his recusal.
Analysis:
This case is significant as an early and influential appellate decision applying the Supreme Court's Daubert standard to the admissibility of DNA evidence. The ruling established a framework in the Ninth Circuit for treating challenges to the specific application of a scientific technique—such as lab errors or protocol violations—as matters of evidentiary weight for the jury, rather than admissibility for the judge. By endorsing the admission of DNA evidence despite ongoing scientific controversies over statistical methods, the decision lowered the barrier for prosecutors to introduce powerful forensic evidence. This shifted the focus of legal battles over DNA from pre-trial admissibility hearings to the trial itself, emphasizing the roles of cross-examination and opposing expert testimony in challenging the evidence before the jury.
