United States v. Crews
445 U.S. 463 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
A victim’s in-court identification of a defendant is not suppressible as a 'fruit' of an unlawful arrest if the identification is based on the victim’s independent memory of the crime itself, untainted by any police misconduct. The defendant's own physical presence in the courtroom, even if brought about by an illegal arrest, does not justify suppressing an otherwise admissible identification.
Facts:
- On January 3, 1974, a woman was robbed at gunpoint in a restroom at the Washington Monument and provided police with a detailed description of her assailant.
- On January 6, two other women were robbed in the same restroom and gave a matching description of the robber.
- On January 9, a police officer saw respondent Crews, noted his resemblance to the suspect's description, and briefly spoke with him.
- After a tour guide tentatively identified Crews as someone he had seen in the area on the day of the first robbery, officers detained Crews.
- Police transported Crews to headquarters, ostensibly for truancy, where he was photographed and released within an hour without being charged.
- The next day, the first robbery victim immediately identified Crews from a photographic array which included the picture taken during his detention.
- A second victim later identified Crews from the same photo array, and both victims subsequently identified him in a court-ordered lineup.
Procedural Posture:
- Respondent Crews was indicted by a grand jury on charges of armed robbery and assault.
- In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (trial court), Crews filed a pretrial motion to suppress all identification testimony.
- The trial court found the detention constituted an arrest without probable cause and suppressed the photographic and lineup identifications.
- However, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the in-court identification, finding it was based on an independent source.
- Following a jury trial, Crews was convicted of one count of armed robbery.
- Crews (as appellant) appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction, holding the in-court identification should have been suppressed.
- The United States (as petitioner) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the exclusionary rule require the suppression of a victim's in-court identification of a defendant when that identification rests on an independent recollection of the initial crime, even if the defendant's presence in court was precipitated by an unlawful arrest?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Brennan
No. An in-court identification that is based on the victim’s independent recollection of the crime itself is not a suppressible fruit of an unlawful arrest. The court analyzed the in-court identification as having three elements, none of which were obtained by exploiting the illegal arrest. First, the victim's presence in court was not a result of police misconduct, as she had voluntarily reported the crime. Second, the victim's memory of the assailant was formed at the time of the crime and thus constituted an independent source, untainted by the later illegal arrest; the 'evidentiary bud had blossomed' before the 'toxin was injected.' Third, a defendant's physical presence at trial is not itself a suppressible 'fruit,' as an illegal arrest does not grant immunity from prosecution, per precedent like Frisbie v. Collins.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Powell
No. An in-court identification should not be suppressed under these circumstances. This concurrence explicitly rejects the idea that a defendant's face could ever be a suppressible fruit of an illegal arrest. The precedents of Frisbie v. Collins and Ker v. Illinois establish that a defendant may be brought to trial even if the arrest was illegal, which forecloses any claim that the defendant's physical presence is suppressible evidence.
Concurring - Mr. Justice White
No. The manner in which the defendant’s presence at trial was obtained is irrelevant to the admissibility of an otherwise untainted in-court identification. The rationale of Frisbie v. Collins controls, holding that a court's power to try a person is not impaired by an unlawful arrest. To hold that a defendant’s face is suppressible evidence would be tantamount to insulating a person from conviction for any crime requiring an in-court identification, a result inconsistent with established precedent. The admissibility of the identification does not depend on whether police had some prior suspicion, but on whether the identification itself has an untainted source.
Analysis:
This case significantly limits the scope of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine as it applies to in-court identifications. It solidifies the 'independent source' exception, establishing that a witness's memory formed during the commission of a crime is a sufficiently independent source to purge the taint of a subsequent illegal arrest. The decision prevents the exclusionary rule from becoming a tool to grant a defendant immunity from prosecution simply because of a procedural error by police. The fractured opinions, however, reveal a deep division on the underlying rationale, specifically whether a defendant's person can ever be considered suppressible evidence.
