United States v. Craig Donnelly
Not yet published, No. 22-30081 (2022)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant committed to the custody of the Attorney General due to mental incompetence to stand trial, under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), cannot be held in pre-hospitalization detention for a period exceeding what is constitutionally reasonable under the Due Process Clause, which generally means not longer than the four-month maximum allowed for the subsequent hospitalization period itself.
Facts:
- Craig Donnelly was charged with three counts of stalking, cyberstalking, and interstate violation of a protective order.
- In August 2021, the district court ordered Donnelly detained without bail.
- On November 18, 2021, after a psychological evaluation and hearing, the district court found Donnelly suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to stand trial.
- The district court committed Donnelly to the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 for hospitalization and treatment in a suitable facility.
- The Bureau of Prisons (BOP), which is delegated responsibility by the Attorney General, was experiencing a significant backlog in placing defendants in suitable treatment facilities.
- Four months after the district court's commitment order, Donnelly remained detained in Oregon awaiting hospitalization.
- Donnelly was informed he would likely have to wait another four months, until July 2022, before a bed would become available.
Procedural Posture:
- Craig Donnelly was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon with stalking, cyberstalking, and interstate violation of a protective order.
- The district court ordered Donnelly detained without bail.
- Following a psychological evaluation and a hearing, the district court found Donnelly mentally incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. § 4241.
- In March 2022, Donnelly filed a motion in the district court seeking dismissal of the indictment, arguing violations of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause due to delays in his hospitalization.
- On May 11, 2022, the district court denied Donnelly’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the four-month time limit in § 4241(d) begins upon hospitalization, not commitment, and that his due process rights were not violated.
- Donnelly (Defendant-Appellant) filed an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss.
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Issue:
Does a federal defendant's prolonged pre-hospitalization detention, lasting over four months after a court-ordered commitment to the Attorney General for competency evaluation and treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), violate constitutional due process requirements, and if so, is dismissal of the indictment the appropriate remedy?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, Craig Donnelly's prolonged pre-hospitalization detention violates his due process rights, but dismissal of the indictment is not the appropriate remedy; instead, immediate hospitalization is required. The court clarified that 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)'s four-month statutory time limit for treatment and evaluation applies to the period of hospitalization itself, beginning when the defendant is hospitalized, not when initially committed to the Attorney General's custody. However, the court held that any pre-hospitalization commitment period, although not explicitly time-limited by statute, must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as established in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Under Jackson, the duration of commitment must "bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." The court reasoned that the purpose of pre-hospitalization commitment is solely to allow the Attorney General time to identify a suitable facility and arrange transportation. It concluded that this pre-hospitalization period cannot reasonably extend longer than the four-month maximum permitted for the actual hospitalization and treatment. Given Donnelly had been held for nearly six months at the time of the district court's ruling and over eight months by the Ninth Circuit's decision, his confinement plainly exceeded any constitutional limit. While acknowledging the violation, the court determined that dismissal of the indictment was not the appropriate remedy, as Congress did not prescribe it for § 4241(d) violations, unlike for instance, the Speedy Trial Act. Instead, citing Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003), the court found that injunctive relief, requiring prompt hospitalization, better served the interests of both the defendant's liberty and Congress's directive to restore competency. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded with instructions to order the Attorney General to hospitalize Donnelly in a suitable facility within seven days.
Concurring - Paul J. Watford
Yes, Craig Donnelly's prolonged wait for a hospital bed violates 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1), and an order directing his hospitalization forthwith is the appropriate remedy. Judge Watford agreed with the per curiam opinion's outcome but argued that the four-month time limit in § 4241(d)(1) was intended by Congress to apply to the entire period a defendant is committed to the Attorney General for treatment and evaluation, including any pre-hospitalization delay, not just the period of hospitalization. He based this interpretation on the plain text of the statute, which states in the same breath that the court "shall commit" and the Attorney General "shall hospitalize" for a period "not to exceed four months." Judge Watford also cited the statute's legislative history, which describes a single period of "commitment under section 4241" not to exceed four months, indicating Congress assumed prompt hospitalization. He contended that the extensive delays are attributable to the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) lack of available bed space, not the time needed to designate a suitable facility, which should reasonably take days. He further noted that Congress authorized the Attorney General to contract with other entities (§ 4247(i)(A)) to address bed space issues, reinforcing the expectation of a short gap between commitment and hospitalization. He concluded that the BOP's bureaucratic failure is not a legitimate excuse for failing to comply with the four-month time limit.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the interplay between statutory competency provisions and constitutional due process, particularly when systemic delays hinder the government's ability to fulfill its obligations. It establishes that even without an explicit statutory remedy like dismissal, federal courts retain supervisory authority to enforce constitutional limits on detention. The decision sets a precedent for challenging prolonged pre-hospitalization custody, compelling federal agencies to act promptly. It underscores that while the four-month limit in § 4241(d) technically applies to hospitalization, due process implicitly imposes an equivalent "reasonable relation" limit on the pre-hospitalization phase, effectively capping it at four months as well.
