United States v. Cottrell
333 F. App'x 213 (2009)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's psychological condition that affects their ability to draw inferences is irrelevant to the objective foreseeability standard required for a conspiracy conviction. However, such evidence is relevant and admissible to challenge the subjective specific intent element for crimes like aiding and abetting.
Facts:
- William Jensen Cottrell, who has Asperger's Syndrome, obtained maps of car dealerships and drove a group of individuals in his car on the night of the incidents.
- Cottrell was present with the group at a gas station while they filled bottles with gasoline to create Molotov cocktails.
- He actively participated with the group in spray-painting vandalism at the dealerships.
- Cottrell was present when a member of the group set a single SUV on fire with a Molotov cocktail.
- After the first arson, Cottrell remained with the group as they continued to other dealerships.
- He was present at the final dealership when eight more SUVs were set on fire with Molotov cocktails.
- Following the events, Cottrell described his involvement to witnesses in a manner that appeared to take credit for the attacks.
- Cottrell also sent several emails to a newspaper claiming responsibility for the arsons.
Procedural Posture:
- William Jensen Cottrell was charged in the U.S. District Court (trial court) with one count of conspiracy to commit arson and seven counts of arson.
- At trial, Cottrell sought to introduce expert testimony regarding his Asperger's Syndrome to challenge the government's evidence of his criminal intent.
- The district court granted the government's motion to exclude the expert testimony.
- A jury convicted Cottrell on the conspiracy count and all seven arson counts.
- The district court sentenced Cottrell to 100 months in prison.
- Cottrell (appellant) appealed his convictions and sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing the trial court erred by excluding the expert evidence.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is expert testimony on a defendant's Asperger's Syndrome admissible to challenge the objective foreseeability element of conspiracy and the subjective specific intent element of aiding and abetting arson?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No as to the conspiracy charge, and yes as to the aiding and abetting charge. Expert testimony on Asperger's Syndrome is not admissible to challenge the objective foreseeability element of conspiracy, but it is admissible to challenge the subjective specific intent element of aiding and abetting. For the conspiracy charge, liability for a co-conspirator's crimes under Pinkerton v. United States rests on an objective standard of reasonable foreseeability. The law is generally unwilling to vary this standard based on an individual's capacity, absent a 'gross and verifiable' disability. The court determined that a condition like Asperger's, which affects a defendant's ability to draw inferences, does not alter this objective standard. For the arson charges, however, the government argued for conviction under an aiding and abetting theory, which is a specific intent crime. This theory requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent—that he associated himself with the venture and sought to make it succeed. Therefore, the Asperger's evidence was relevant to negate the inference of Cottrell's subjective intent, and its exclusion was an abuse of discretion that requires vacating the arson convictions.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Pregerson, J.
Yes, the evidence is admissible for both the aiding and abetting and the conspiracy charges. I agree with the majority that the evidence of Asperger's Syndrome was improperly excluded for the aiding and abetting charge because it is relevant to the defendant's specific intent. However, I dissent from the majority's conclusion regarding the conspiracy charge. The objective foreseeability standard includes an exception for a disability that is 'both gross and verifiable.' I believe Asperger's Syndrome meets this requirement. A defendant's perception of what is reasonably foreseeable could be significantly impaired by this disability, and evidence of its severity should have been presented to the jury to assess whether arson was a reasonably foreseeable act of the conspiracy for Cottrell. Therefore, the evidence should have been admitted for the conspiracy charge as well.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the critical distinction between objective and subjective standards of criminal intent (mens rea) and how that distinction governs the admissibility of evidence related to a defendant's psychological state. It establishes that for general intent or objective foreseeability crimes like conspiracy, a defendant's unique mental condition is typically irrelevant, preserving a uniform legal standard. Conversely, for specific intent crimes like aiding and abetting, the defendant's actual state of mind is paramount, making psychological evidence highly relevant. The dissent signals a potential pathway for future defendants to argue that conditions like Asperger's should qualify as 'gross and verifiable' disabilities, which could create an exception to the objective standard in conspiracy cases.
