United States v. Cortés-Cabán
691 F.3d 1 (2012)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The act of transferring a controlled substance to another person satisfies the specific intent to 'distribute' required for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), regardless of the defendant's ultimate motive or purpose for the transfer.
Facts:
- Members of the Puerto Rico Police Department’s Mayagüez Drugs and Narcotics Division maintained a 'black box' containing various illegal drugs, including crack, cocaine, and heroin.
- A supervisor, Pascual Santiago-Méndez ('Santiago'), kept custody of the box and, along with Lieutenant Dennis Muñiz, instructed officers to use its contents to plant evidence if a search or intervention was not 'positive.'
- On numerous occasions, officers, including Santiago, Anthony Domínguez-Colón ('Domínguez'), and Victor Cortés-Caban ('Cortés'), took drugs from the box or from fellow officers.
- These officers then planted the drugs in the homes, cars, or on the persons of targeted individuals to fabricate grounds for arrest.
- One such incident involved fabricating drug charges against three minors who had stolen a lieutenant's daughter's car.
- In another incident, Santiago gave drugs to an agent with specific instructions to plant them in the home and car of Omayra Segarra, known as 'Puchi.'
- An officer cooperating with the FBI, Agent José Bosques, recorded a conversation where he obtained cocaine and marijuana from Domínguez for the stated purpose of planting them on his neighbors.
- Luis Enrique Ruperto-Torres ('Ruperto'), a ranking officer, told Bosques he had 'to deal with that' if a suspect had no drugs on them and laughed about another officer's fabrication of a case.
Procedural Posture:
- Pascual Santiago-Méndez, Anthony Domínguez-Colón, Victor Cortés-Caban, and Luis Enrique Ruperto-Torres were charged in a two-count indictment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.
- Count one alleged conspiracy to violate civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241, and count two alleged conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846.
- Following a jury trial, all four defendants were convicted on count one.
- Santiago, Cortés, and Domínguez were also convicted on count two, while Ruperto was acquitted of that count.
- The defendants filed motions for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which the district court denied.
- The convicted defendants (appellants) appealed their convictions and sentences to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the act of police officers planting controlled substances on individuals to fabricate criminal charges satisfy the specific intent to 'distribute' required for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Lynch
Yes, the act of police officers planting controlled substances on individuals satisfies the specific intent to 'distribute' required under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The plain language of the Controlled Substances Act defines 'distribute' broadly as 'to deliver,' which means 'the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer' of a substance. The officers’ conduct of taking drugs and placing them on or near their victims is a 'transfer' and thus falls squarely within this definition. The statute’s specific intent requirement is satisfied by the intent to perform this proscribed act of transfer; the defendants' ultimate motive, such as fabricating a case, is irrelevant. Furthermore, Congress provided a specific immunity for officers 'lawfully engaged' in enforcing drug laws (21 U.S.C. § 885(d)), which implies that officers who are not 'lawfully engaged'—such as by planting evidence—can be prosecuted under the statute.
Dissenting - Judge Torruella
No, the officers’ intent to fabricate cases by planting evidence does not constitute the specific intent to distribute controlled substances as contemplated by Congress. The majority's analysis incorrectly conflates the physical act of moving a substance (the actus reus) with the required mental state (the mens rea) of intending to distribute. The purpose of the Controlled Substances Act is to combat drug abuse and drug trafficking. The officers' actions served neither of these ends; their intent was always to fabricate a case, and the drugs were merely an instrument to achieve that end, which were then immediately recovered and stored for reuse. This interpretation improperly dilutes a specific intent crime into a general intent crime and represents a novel, unprecedented application of the statute that goes beyond its legislative purpose.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the scope of 'intent to distribute' under federal drug law, establishing that the defendant's ultimate motive for transferring a controlled substance is legally irrelevant. The ruling provides federal prosecutors with a powerful tool to charge corrupt law enforcement officers who plant evidence, using a statute traditionally aimed at drug traffickers. This creates a strong deterrent against police misconduct but also raises questions about the outer boundaries of the statute's application, as the dissent argues it stretches the law beyond its original congressional intent of targeting the illicit drug market and drug abuse.
Unlock the full brief for United States v. Cortés-Cabán