United States v. Copelin
996 F.2d 379 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
When highly prejudicial 'bad acts' evidence is admitted under FRE 404(b) solely for the purpose of impeaching a defendant's credibility, it constitutes reversible plain error for the trial court to fail to issue an immediate limiting instruction sua sponte, as the risk of the jury giving the evidence an impermissible substantive effect is too great.
Facts:
- Vanessa Moore, an undercover police officer, used pre-recorded currency to purchase two rocks of crack cocaine from a man she identified as Warren Ricardo Copelin.
- The seller produced the drugs from a brown medicine bottle.
- Following the transaction, Officer Moore broadcast a description of the suspect.
- An arrest team stopped Copelin minutes later, and Officer Moore confirmed his identity as the seller.
- A search of Copelin revealed he was in possession of the pre-recorded currency used in the drug purchase.
- At the scene of the arrest, an officer found a brown medicine bottle on the ground containing 5.634 grams of cocaine base.
- At trial, Copelin claimed mistaken identity, asserting he was playing dice with another man, David Bailey, who was the actual seller.
- During cross-examination, Copelin testified that he had never seen illegal drugs except on television.
Procedural Posture:
- Warren Ricardo Copelin was charged in the U.S. District Court with unlawful distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
- During the trial, the prosecutor sought and received permission, over a defense objection, to cross-examine Copelin about his prior positive drug tests.
- The trial judge did not provide the jury with an immediate limiting instruction concerning the permissible use of this evidence.
- The jury found Copelin guilty on the distribution count but acquitted him on the possession with intent to distribute count.
- The district court sentenced Copelin to sixty-three months of incarceration.
- Copelin appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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Issue:
Is it reversible plain error for a trial court to fail to issue, sua sponte, an immediate limiting instruction when highly prejudicial 'bad acts' evidence is admitted solely for the purpose of impeaching a defendant's testimony?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Mikva
Yes, it is reversible plain error for a trial court to fail to give an immediate limiting instruction when admitting highly prejudicial 'bad acts' evidence solely for impeachment, as the jury is likely to be substantially prejudiced by considering the evidence for impermissible, substantive purposes. The court reasoned that while the evidence of Copelin's positive drug tests was admissible under FRE 404(b) to impeach his testimony that he had only seen drugs on TV, it was evidence of the 'most prejudicial sort.' It not only subjected him to the jury's potential opprobrium toward drug users but also tended to bolster the government's substantive argument that he was the person who sold drugs to the officer. This court's precedent creates a 'huge presumption of plain error' when a judge omits a cautionary instruction for impeachment evidence that a jury could give substantive effect against a criminal defendant. The government's argument that the evidence was also admissible to show knowledge was rejected, as that was not the basis for admission at trial and Copelin's knowledge was not a contested issue. Given the high risk of unfair prejudice, the judge's failure to provide an immediate limiting instruction, even without a request from defense counsel, affected Copelin's substantial rights and constituted a plain error requiring a new trial.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the D.C. Circuit's position on the necessity of limiting instructions for prejudicial impeachment evidence. While stepping back from a strict per se rule that any omission is plain error, the court establishes a very strong presumption of error, placing an affirmative duty on trial judges to act sua sponte. The ruling emphasizes that the potential for a jury to misuse 'bad acts' evidence as propensity evidence is so high that judicial intervention is required to ensure a fair trial. This precedent serves as a crucial safeguard for criminal defendants and a clear directive to trial courts about their non-delegable duty to manage the introduction of prejudicial evidence.
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