United States v. Connelly

Majority - Kurt D. Engelhardt

Yes, the Second Amendment, as interpreted by Bruen and Rahimi 2024, renders 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) unconstitutional as applied to a non-violent, sober individual who occasionally uses marijuana. No, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and § 922(d)(3) are not facially unconstitutional because there are circumstances where they are valid. The court applied the two-step framework for Second Amendment challenges established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) and clarified by United States v. Rahimi (2024). The first step asks whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, which the court found it does for Paola Connelly as a member of “the people” with a presumptive right to bear arms. The second step requires the government to demonstrate that the challenged regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, showing 'relevantly similar' historical precursors that share a comparable 'why' (the problem addressed) and a comparable 'how' (the burden imposed). Regarding Paola Connelly’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(3), the court rejected the government's proffered historical analogues: 1. Laws disarming the mentally ill: The court found that historical restrictions on the mentally ill pertained to severe mental incapacitation, often warranting confinement, which is not comparable to a sober, occasional marijuana user. Historical tradition also allowed for the restoration of rights upon recovery, indicating a focus on present, severe impairment, not past conditions. 2. Laws disarming 'dangerous' individuals: The government's examples, such as disarming political dissidents (e.g., English Loyalists, Catholics) during periods of conflict or the English Militia Act of 1662 (used to disarm political opponents), addressed threats of political insurrection or societal upheaval. The 'why' behind these historical laws was not 'relevantly similar' to disarming a non-violent, occasional drug user. 3. Intoxication laws: While acknowledging the Founders' understanding of the dangers of presently intoxicated individuals handling firearms, historical laws primarily focused on preventing weapon misuse while actively under the influence or disciplining militia members. The court found no Founding-era tradition of disarming ordinary citizens for habitual drunkenness when sober, nor do a few post-Reconstruction laws banning carrying while drunk establish a broad historical tradition for disarming sober individuals based on past use. The court noted that 'unlawful user' under § 922(g)(3) extends to individuals not presently intoxicated, and can infer 'current use' from a conviction within the past year, which imposes a far greater burden than historical laws supported. Therefore, the court concluded that § 922(g)(3) as applied to Paola Connelly imposes a greater burden on her Second Amendment rights than our history and tradition of firearms regulation can support, as it bans all possession for an 'unlawful user' even when sober, based on past or occasional use. However, the court reversed the District Court’s finding that §§ 922(g)(3) and 922(d)(3) are facially unconstitutional. A facial challenge requires demonstrating that 'no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.' The court found that historical intoxication laws support the constitutionality of banning presently intoxicated persons from carrying weapons, providing at least some valid applications for § 922(g)(3). Similarly, § 922(d)(3), which prohibits transferring firearms to an unlawful user, is a straightforward extension, as prohibiting transfer to a presently intoxicated individual would also be constitutional. Thus, the facial challenges failed.