United States v. Clayton Fountain, Thomas E. Silverstein, and Randy K. Gometz
1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 20420, 768 F.2d 790, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 1201 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 does not violate the Seventh Amendment because criminal restitution is a traditional criminal remedy, not a civil judgment requiring a jury. However, the Act does not authorize restitution awards for a victim's lost future earnings if the amount is disputed, as such a calculation would unduly complicate the sentencing process.
Facts:
- Thomas Silverstein and Clayton Fountain were inmates at the maximum-security federal penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, both already serving multiple life sentences for murder.
- On October 22, 1983, while being escorted from a shower, Silverstein stopped next to inmate Randy Gometz's cell.
- Gometz passed a homemade knife to Silverstein after Silverstein's handcuffs were released.
- Silverstein then used the knife to stab and kill guard Robert Clutts.
- Later that same day, Fountain, while being escorted from the recreation room, obtained a knife from another inmate's cell after his handcuffs were also removed.
- Fountain attacked his three escorting guards, killing guard Merle Hoffman and severely injuring guards Ditterline and Powles.
Procedural Posture:
- Fountain was tried by a jury in the United States District Court and convicted of first-degree murder.
- Silverstein and Gometz were tried together by a jury in the same court and convicted for murder and aiding and abetting.
- The district court judge sentenced all three defendants to prison terms of 50 to 150 years.
- The judge also ordered the defendants to pay substantial restitution to the victims' estates and the Department of Labor pursuant to the Victim and Witness Protection Act, including compensation for lost future earnings.
- Fountain, Silverstein, and Gometz (appellants) appealed their convictions and sentences to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 violate the Seventh Amendment by permitting a sentencing judge, rather than a jury, to order a criminal defendant to pay restitution for a victim's medical expenses and lost earnings?
Opinions:
Majority - Posner, J.
No. The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 is constitutional because criminal restitution is a traditional criminal remedy that predates the Seventh Amendment and is not a civil suit at law requiring a jury. Restitution for a victim's out-of-pocket expenses, such as medical and funeral costs and past lost wages, is analogous to the historical practice of forcing a criminal to return the fruits of the crime. However, the Act does not authorize an order of restitution for lost future earnings if the amount is in dispute. The calculation of future earnings is a complex process involving speculative projections and discount rates, which would 'unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process' in violation of the Act's own procedural limitations. An order of restitution is proper even for indigent defendants to ensure they do not profit from their crimes, for instance, by selling the story of their crimes.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Swygert, J.
This opinion would vacate the restitution orders entirely, not on constitutional grounds, but because the district judge failed to make a meaningful inquiry into the financial resources and earning ability of the defendants as required by statute. Basing the awards on the mere speculation that the defendants might one day sell their life stories is improper and does not satisfy the statutory requirement to balance the needs of the victims and the defendants. The majority's per se rule precluding restitution for disputed future earnings is also incorrect, as it contradicts congressional intent and presumes district judges are incapable of performing such calculations expeditiously. The dissent also argues that the defendants' convictions should be reversed due to trial errors, including improper cross-examination regarding prior crimes and the denial of Fountain's right to compulsory process.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the constitutionality of the Victim and Witness Protection Act against Seventh Amendment challenges by firmly characterizing restitution as a criminal, not civil, remedy. It significantly curtails the scope of restitution by creating a practical, bright-line rule against awarding damages for disputed lost future earnings, prioritizing expediency in sentencing over a full tort-like recovery for victims. This holding draws a key distinction between easily calculable past losses and speculative future losses, providing clear guidance to lower courts and influencing how restitution is calculated in federal criminal cases.
