United States v. Clary
846 F. Supp. 768 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A facially neutral sentencing statute violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment if its enactment was motivated by unconscious racial bias and results in a starkly disparate impact on a particular racial group, without being narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.
Facts:
- Edward James Clary, a black male, was arrested for possessing 67.76 grams of cocaine base (crack cocaine).
- Clary intended to distribute the crack cocaine for a profit.
- The governing federal statute at the time, 21 U.S.C. § 841, mandated a 10-year minimum sentence for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams of crack cocaine.
- The same 10-year mandatory minimum sentence applied to possession with intent to distribute 5,000 grams of powder cocaine, creating a 100-to-1 quantity disparity.
- Statistical evidence presented showed that nationally in 1992, 92.6% of defendants convicted of federal crack cocaine violations were black, while only 4.7% were white.
- In contrast, 45.2% of defendants sentenced for powder cocaine offenses were white, while 20.7% were black.
Procedural Posture:
- Edward James Clary was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base.
- Clary pled guilty to the charge.
- Prior to sentencing, Clary filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of the federal crack cocaine sentencing statute (21 U.S.C. § 841) and the related U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
- The district court held extended hearings on Clary's constitutional motion.
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Issue:
Does the 100-to-1 sentencing ratio between crack cocaine and powder cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841 violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Cahill, District Judge
Yes, the 100-to-1 sentencing ratio in the crack statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. A law that disproportionately burdens a racial minority and whose enactment was influenced by racial considerations, even if unconscious, is subject to strict scrutiny and is unconstitutional if not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. The court found that the statute's passage was tainted by unconscious racism, fueled by a media-driven frenzy that stereotyped crack users and dealers as young black men. Applying the Arlington Heights factors, the court inferred a discriminatory purpose from: 1) the statute's overwhelmingly disparate impact on black defendants; 2) the historical background of racially biased drug laws; 3) the hasty, 'frenzied' legislative process that bypassed normal procedures; and 4) the foreseeability of its racially disparate consequences. The government's asserted interests in crack's alleged higher danger and potency were deemed not compelling, as they were not supported by scientific evidence and the statute was not narrowly tailored, as Congress could have simply punished powder cocaine offenses with equal severity.
Analysis:
This district court opinion is significant for introducing the concept of 'unconscious racism' as a basis for finding discriminatory intent under the Equal Protection Clause for a facially neutral law. By applying the Arlington Heights factors through this lens, the court provides a novel legal framework for challenging statutes with a severe disparate racial impact. While not binding on other courts, the decision provided a detailed and persuasive roadmap for future constitutional challenges to the crack-powder sentencing disparity, challenging the consensus among appellate courts at the time and contributing to a growing judicial and public re-examination of the policy.
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