United States v. Christopher Esqueda
88 F.4th 818 (2023)
Rule of Law:
An undercover officer who physically enters a premises with express consent and secretly records only what they can see and hear by virtue of their consented entry does not engage in a search violative of the Fourth Amendment under the trespassory, unlicensed physical intrusion test.
Facts:
- In January 2020, a confidential informant and undercover officers from the ATF and CMPD conducted a controlled purchase of a firearm from Christopher Esqueda.
- On January 22, 2020, the officers returned to the Valencia Inn Motel, where Esqueda was staying in Room 302 and had paid for half the room's cost.
- Daniel Alvarado, Esqueda's co-defendant, opened the door to Room 302 and allowed the officers to enter.
- Unbeknownst to either Esqueda or Alvarado, the officers were wearing concealed audio-video recording devices.
- Once inside the room, officers met Esqueda, whom they had not previously known.
- After officers inquired about a 'Derringer' firearm, Alvarado directed Esqueda to retrieve it.
- Esqueda produced a .22 caliber revolver from his person, stated it was loaded, and handed it to an ATF undercover officer, who then paid $400 for it.
- The video recordings depicted the interior of Esqueda’s motel room during the encounter and captured the firearm transaction.
Procedural Posture:
- In October 2020, a federal grand jury indicted Christopher Esqueda under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm as a felon.
- Esqueda moved to suppress the video evidence and any derived fruits in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
- The district court (Judge John F. Walter presiding) denied Esqueda's motion to suppress, ruling that no Fourth Amendment search had occurred.
- Esqueda subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
- The district court sentenced Esqueda to 24 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release and entered judgment of conviction.
- Esqueda, as Defendant-Appellant, appealed the district court's decision denying his motion to suppress to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does an undercover officer conduct a Fourth Amendment search under the trespassory, unlicensed physical intrusion test when the officer, with express consent to enter a private premises, surreptitiously records only what they can perceive with their natural senses while inside?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Bea
No, an undercover officer does not conduct a Fourth Amendment search under the trespassory, unlicensed physical intrusion test when, with express consent to enter a private premises, they surreptitiously record only what they can perceive with their natural senses while inside. The Court rejected Esqueda's argument that the secret recording exceeded the scope of the 'implied license' granted by his consent to physical entry. Longstanding Supreme Court precedent, specifically Lopez v. United States and On Lee v. United States, dictates that an undercover officer who physically enters with express consent and records only what they can see and hear does not trespass or physically intrude in a manner violative of the Fourth Amendment. The Court clarified that the Supreme Court's decisions in Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Jones do not disturb this well-settled principle. Unlike Jardines, where officers had no consent to bring a drug-sniffing dog onto the curtilage for a search, the officers here had Esqueda's express consent to enter the motel room for the specific purpose of engaging in the illicit firearms transaction. The recording merely provided a reliable means to capture what the agents were lawfully present to see and hear, a risk Esqueda assumed by voluntarily engaging in illicit activity in their presence. The device 'was carried in and out by an agent who was there with petitioner’s assent, and it neither saw nor heard more than the agent himself.'
Analysis:
This case clarifies the limits of the Fourth Amendment's property-based trespassory test (reinvigorated by Jones and Jardines) when applied to undercover operations involving consensual entry. It reaffirms the long-standing precedent that individuals assume the risk that their words and actions will be accurately recorded when they invite an undercover agent into a private space. The decision is significant for law enforcement, solidifying the constitutionality of concealed recording in such scenarios, provided the recording device does not detect more than the agent's natural senses. It distinguishes 'unlicensed physical intrusions' (as in Jardines) from situations where consent to enter is expressly granted, even if that consent is obtained via deception regarding the agent's true identity or purpose.
