United States v. Christopher B. Carroll
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1804, 1997 WL 33311, 105 F.3d 740 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
The statutory mens rea requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), 'with the intent that such minor engage in' sexually explicit conduct, modifies only the clause criminalizing the transportation of a minor and does not apply to the clause criminalizing the use of a minor to engage in such conduct.
Facts:
- In the summer of 1995, Christopher B. Carroll and his wife, Tammy, separated.
- While sorting Carroll's possessions, Tammy discovered two undeveloped rolls of film.
- The film contained 46 photographs of Carroll's minor niece, Brittany, in various states of undress, posing with sex toys.
- Carroll had told Brittany he was going to take the film from New Hampshire to Massachusetts to be developed.
- Carroll also discussed with Brittany a plan to scan the images into a friend's computer in Massachusetts and distribute them on the Internet.
- Previously, Carroll and his friend had attempted to scan other pornographic images into the friend's computer.
Procedural Posture:
- Christopher B. Carroll was indicted in federal district court for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
- At his jury trial in the U.S. District Court, Carroll moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied.
- The trial judge instructed the jury on the elements of the offense, omitting the specific intent element Carroll argued was required by the statute.
- The jury convicted Carroll.
- After being sentenced, Carroll, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the statutory phrase 'with the intent that such minor engage in' apply to the clause of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) criminalizing the act of using or persuading a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, thereby requiring the government to prove this specific intent as an element of that offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Selya, Circuit Judge
No, the statutory phrase 'with the intent that such minor engage in' sexually explicit conduct does not apply to the 'use' clause of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The court found that the authoritative version of the statute, as published in the Statutes at Large, contains a comma after the phrase 'engage in,'. This comma serves to grammatically restrict the 'intent' phrase to the third category of proscribed conduct: transporting a minor in interstate commerce. This interpretation is supported by plain meaning and common sense; transporting a minor is not inherently criminal without a blameworthy intent, whereas using a minor to produce pornography is inherently criminal, making an additional intent requirement illogical. The legislative history further supports this reading, as the transportation clause and the disputed intent phrase were added to the statute together in a 1986 amendment, with no indication Congress intended to alter the existing elements for the 'use' and 'assistance' clauses.
Analysis:
This decision serves as a significant precedent on statutory interpretation, establishing that the official text in the Statutes at Large is controlling over potentially erroneous versions in unofficial compilations like the U.S. Code Annotated. It clarifies the distinct mens rea requirements for different offenses within 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), thereby lowering the prosecutorial burden for convictions under the 'use' and 'assistance' prongs. By limiting the specific intent requirement to the 'transportation' clause, the ruling makes it easier for the government to prosecute the act of producing child pornography without needing to prove an additional, and potentially redundant, layer of intent.
