United States v. Charles Lynch
903 F.3d 1061 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
A district court's instruction to a jury that nullification is a 'violation of the juror’s oath' is a permissible exercise of the court’s duty to ensure the jury follows the law and does not unconstitutionally coerce the jury, particularly when the warning is prompted by defense counsel's questions and a prospective juror's statements about nullification.
Facts:
- In 2005, Charles Lynch operated a marijuana store in Atascadero, California, which was shut down by the town.
- Before opening a new dispensary, Lynch claims he called the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and was told that the legality of medical marijuana dispensaries was a matter for local cities and counties to decide.
- In April 2006, Lynch opened a new dispensary called Central Coast Compassionate Caregivers (CCCC) in Morro Bay, California.
- CCCC employed approximately 10 people and, during its operation, sold $2.1 million in marijuana and related products.
- An employee of CCCC, Abraham Baxter, sold a significant quantity of marijuana to an undercover government agent.
- In March 2007, the DEA obtained a search warrant and raided Lynch's home and the dispensary.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States indicted Charles Lynch in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on five counts related to conspiracy and distribution of marijuana.
- During jury selection (voir dire), the district judge delivered a strong admonition against jury nullification.
- At trial, Lynch admitted to facts sufficient for a conviction but argued the defense of entrapment by estoppel based on an alleged call with the DEA.
- The jury convicted Lynch on all five counts.
- Lynch filed several unsuccessful motions for a new trial.
- The district court sentenced Lynch to one year and one day in prison, declining to apply a five-year mandatory minimum by using a 'safety valve' provision.
- Lynch (Defendant-Appellant) appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the United States (Plaintiff-Appellee) cross-appealed the sentence.
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Issue:
Does a district court's anti-nullification instruction during voir dire, which states that nullification is a 'violation of the juror's oath,' violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Rogers
No. The district court’s instruction that nullification is a violation of a juror's oath does not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Trial courts have a duty to forestall or prevent jury nullification, which is a violation of the sworn duty to follow the law. The language used by the district court accurately stated the law, as recognized in prior case law, and was not coercive because it did not state or imply that jurors could be punished for nullification. The warning was a justifiable response to a prospective juror's invocation of nullification, a risk that was invited by the questioning of Lynch's own counsel.
Dissenting - Judge Watford
Yes. The district court's instruction violated Lynch's constitutional right to a trial by jury. By stating that nullification is a 'violation of the juror’s oath,' the court implicitly threatened jurors with punishment for perjury or contempt, which is inherently coercive and subverts the jury's role as a safeguard against government oppression. This error cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, especially given the dramatic and emphatic manner in which the instruction was delivered after singling out the issue during voir dire. The court went beyond merely discouraging nullification and unconstitutionally interfered with the jury's power.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the permissible scope of judicial anti-nullification instructions, reinforcing the principle that while juries have the power to nullify, they have no right to do so. The decision establishes that a judge can firmly instruct that nullification violates a juror's oath without being unconstitutionally coercive, as long as there is no explicit or implicit threat of punishment. The holding distinguishes between instructing on a duty (permissible) and threatening sanction for its breach (impermissible), providing lower courts with a clearer line, especially when a defendant's trial strategy appears to encourage nullification. The strong dissent, however, signals an ongoing debate over how forcefully courts can guard against nullification without infringing on the jury's historical function as the 'conscience of the community.'
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