United States v. Charles Layton Cox
428 F.2d 683 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
Property that a person voluntarily abandons, such as hair clippings from a routine prison haircut that the person does not attempt to retain, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, and its subsequent seizure and analysis by the government without a warrant is permissible.
Facts:
- On November 17, 1967, two armed men wearing masks robbed the Silver Lake State Bank in Wisconsin of approximately $13,000.
- The robbers fled in a maroon Buick, which was pursued by Kenosha County Deputy Sheriff Gerald Van Patten.
- After the Buick crashed into a telephone pole, two unmasked men exited the vehicle and fled on foot.
- Van Patten observed one of the men, whom he later identified as Charles Layton Cox, for several seconds from a distance of 45 to 60 feet.
- A subsequent search of the abandoned Buick uncovered money from the bank, masks, a gun, and a hair sample from the cracked windshield that matched Cox's hair.
- A few minutes after the crash, Cox appeared at a nearby farm, telling the farmer he had been stealing gravel and that there had been an accident.
- Over a month after his arrest, while in jail, Cox received a routine haircut administered by a deputy sheriff.
- At the request of the FBI, the deputy preserved the clippings from Cox's haircut; Cox did not object to the haircut or indicate any desire to retain the clippings.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles Layton Cox was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin for bank robbery.
- Before trial, Cox filed a motion to suppress the identification testimony of Officer Van Patten, which the trial court denied.
- Cox also moved before trial to limit the government's ability to impeach him with prior felony convictions, a motion the trial court also denied.
- After a trial, a jury found Cox guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d).
- Cox (appellant) appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures prevent the government from collecting and analyzing hair clippings from a prisoner's routine haircut without a warrant, when the prisoner does not express a desire to keep the clippings?
Opinions:
Majority - Cummings, Circuit Judge
No. The Fourth Amendment is not violated because clippings from a routine jail haircut that the prisoner makes no effort to retain are considered voluntarily abandoned property. The court reasoned that the 'seizure' did not occur when the hair was cut as part of a regular, non-pretextual jail hygiene procedure, but rather when the government appropriated the clippings which the defendant had abandoned. Unlike a forced blood draw, the haircut itself was a standard procedure to which Cox did not object. By failing to indicate any intent to possess the severed hair, Cox relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Citing Abel v. United States, the court held that a defendant who voluntarily abandons property may not object to its subsequent appropriation and use as evidence by the government.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the Fourth Amendment's abandonment doctrine, particularly as it applies to physical evidence derived from a person's body while in official custody. The ruling establishes that items severed from the body during routine, non-investigatory procedures (like a haircut) are not subject to Fourth Amendment protection if the individual shows no intent to maintain possession. This creates a clear precedent allowing law enforcement to collect such evidence without a warrant, distinguishing it from more invasive bodily intrusions like blood tests, which require a warrant or exigent circumstances. The case thereby provides a pathway for collecting certain types of physical evidence based on an inmate's implicit act of abandonment.
