United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc.
1952 U.S. LEXIS 2631, 97 L. Ed. 2d 157, 344 U.S. 149 (1953)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause does not require the government to provide just compensation for private property destroyed by the military during wartime to prevent it from being captured and used by an advancing enemy.
Facts:
- Respondent oil companies owned and operated petroleum terminal facilities in the Pandacan district of Manila, Philippines.
- Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Japanese forces began an amphibious assault and advanced on Manila.
- On December 12, 1941, the U.S. Army began restricting the distribution of petroleum products from the terminals, requisitioning a major share for military use.
- On December 23, the U.S. Commanding General ordered a withdrawal of all troops to the Bataan Peninsula.
- On December 25, the Army formally requisitioned the oil depots, stating that any necessary destruction of the property would be handled by the Army.
- Between December 27 and December 31, Army personnel, with the assistance of company representatives, prepared the facilities for demolition.
- On December 31, 1941, as Japanese troops were entering Manila, U.S. Army personnel successfully demolished the terminals to render them useless to the enemy.
Procedural Posture:
- After the war, the respondent oil companies demanded compensation from the United States government for their destroyed terminal facilities.
- The government paid for destroyed petroleum stocks it had used but refused to compensate for the destruction of the physical terminals.
- Respondents sued the United States in the Court of Claims, alleging a right to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
- The Court of Claims, the court of first instance, found for the respondents and allowed recovery.
- The United States (petitioner) appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Fifth Amendment require the United States to provide just compensation for private property destroyed by the military during wartime to prevent it from being captured and used by an advancing enemy?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Vinson
No. The destruction of private property by the military to prevent it from falling into enemy hands is not a compensable taking for public use under the Fifth Amendment. The Court reasoned that such destruction is a non-compensable consequence of war, falling under the common law doctrine of necessity, where a sovereign may destroy private property to prevent a greater public peril without incurring an obligation to compensate the owner. This action was not an appropriation of property for the Army's own use, but rather a strategic destruction to deny a valuable resource to an advancing enemy, akin to destroying a bridge during a retreat. Citing United States v. Pacific R. Co., the Court held that the necessities of war and the safety of the state override considerations of private loss in such circumstances.
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
Yes. The Fifth Amendment requires compensation because the property was deliberately appropriated for a public purpose—helping to win the war—and the public, not the individual owner, should bear the cost. The dissent argued that the destruction was a calculated military decision to deprive the enemy of a strategic asset for the common good. This action was functionally equivalent to requisitioning supplies for the defense effort. The guiding principle should be that whenever the government appropriates private property as essential to the war effort, the public purse must compensate the individual owner for the loss.
Analysis:
This case establishes a critical distinction within Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence between compensable appropriation and non-compensable destruction out of military necessity. By classifying the 'scorched earth' destruction of property to prevent enemy capture as a non-compensable act of war, the Court placed the financial burden of such strategic losses on the individual property owner rather than the public treasury. This 'denial taking' doctrine significantly limits the scope of the Takings Clause in a wartime context. The decision provides legal immunity for battlefield commanders making tactical decisions to destroy property that could aid an enemy, shaping the allocation of risks during armed conflict.
