United States v. Byron Mitchell
145 F.3d 572, 49 Fed. R. Serv. 361, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9714 (1998)
Rule of Law:
An anonymous hearsay statement, particularly when its author's personal perception of the event described and the circumstances of its creation are unknown, is inadmissible under the present sense impression, excited utterance, or residual hearsay exceptions, as it lacks the inherent guarantees of trustworthiness required by both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Corroborating evidence at trial cannot be used to establish the inherent trustworthiness of such a statement for Confrontation Clause purposes.
Facts:
- Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. on September 12, 1991, two men attacked an armored truck delivery man at a check cashing store in North Philadelphia, robbing him of over $20,000.
- The two assailants fled the scene in a beige car, driven by a third person, and exchanged gunfire with those in the armored truck.
- At 9:37 a.m., a 911 radio room received an anonymous call stating that "these guys just dumped this beige car" in the 1660 block of 32nd street and "jumped into another car and took off," providing the beige car's license plate number.
- At 10:00 a.m., police officers found the beige getaway car at the location provided by the 911 caller, and FBI agents recovered two anonymous notes from the front seat.
- One note, challenged in the appeal, stated: "Light green ZPJ-254. They changed cars; this is the other car," with "ZPJ-254" being the license plate number of a green 1978 Buick registered to Anita Young, who was then Byron Mitchell's fiancée.
- Kim Chester, girlfriend of one of the robbers, overheard Robinson, Stewart, and Mitchell discuss the robbery and obtaining a getaway car, and on the morning of September 12, 1991, saw them drive by in Anita Young's green car.
- Later that afternoon, an FBI agent observed Mitchell park the green Buick and enter Young’s house, and upon stopping him for traffic violations, searched Mitchell and found $1,400 in small bills and a receipt for a $600 cash payment to a lawyer made earlier that day.
- FBI agent Duane Johnson testified that there were nine points of similarity between two fingerprints found in the getaway car (on the outside door handle and gear shift) and Mitchell's fingerprints.
Procedural Posture:
- Byron Mitchell was indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit and commission of Hobbs Act robbery, and use of and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence.
- Mitchell sought to exclude the anonymous note and other evidence before trial, arguing it was inadmissible hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
- The district court overruled Mitchell's objections and admitted the anonymous note into evidence, deeming it admissible as a present sense impression, an excited utterance, or under the residual hearsay exception.
- A jury convicted Mitchell on each count.
- Mitchell was sentenced to 24 years imprisonment, three years of supervised release, a special assessment of $150, and ordered to pay restitution.
- Mitchell filed a direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the admission of an anonymous written note, linking the defendant to a getaway car, violate the Federal Rules of Evidence's hearsay rules (specifically the present sense impression, excited utterance, or residual exceptions) and the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, when there is no evidence that the author personally perceived the events or that the statement possesses inherent guarantees of trustworthiness?
Opinions:
Majority - Sloviter, Circuit Judge
Yes, the admission of the anonymous written note violated the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause because the government failed to establish the foundational requirements for its admission under any hearsay exception. The court first found that the note was not admissible as a present sense impression or an excited utterance under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1) and 803(2), respectively. For both exceptions, the declarant must have personally perceived the event described. Citing Miller v. Keating, the court emphasized that for an anonymous statement, the burden to demonstrate circumstantial trustworthiness, including personal perception, is heavier. The record was "devoid of circumstances indicating by a preponderance that the author of the anonymous note actually saw Mitchell change cars," making it equally likely the declarant was "hypothesizing or repeating what someone else had said." The court also noted a lack of evidence regarding the note's contemporaneity with the event or the author's state of excitement. Second, the court held the note was not admissible under the residual catch-all hearsay exception (then Fed.R.Evid. 803(24), now 807). This exception requires "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" and, for Confrontation Clause purposes, "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Citing Idaho v. Wright, the court ruled that the district court erred by using corroborating evidence (like Mitchell's fingerprints and his operation of the green car) to establish trustworthiness. Under the Confrontation Clause, trustworthiness must derive from the "inherent trustworthiness" of the hearsay statement itself and its surrounding circumstances, not from other evidence at trial, as this would amount to "bootstrapping." The government failed to provide any evidence regarding the note's author or creation circumstances, thus failing to show that cross-examination would be of marginal utility. Finally, the court concluded that the erroneous admission of the note was not harmless error, applying the constitutional error standard from Chapman v. California, which requires the government to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Given the "legitimate questions raised" about the other evidence (fragile fingerprint evidence that the jury struggled with, and a witness (Kim Chester) who admitted to being a "liar and a thief" and drug user, prompting a cautionary instruction), the court could not be sure the note did not contribute to the jury's verdict.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the high bar for admitting anonymous hearsay statements under exceptions, particularly when the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is implicated. It solidifies the principle established in Idaho v. Wright that the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" required for non-firmly rooted hearsay exceptions must stem from the inherent circumstances surrounding the statement's creation, not from corroborating evidence found elsewhere in the trial. This decision limits the ability of the prosecution to use anonymous tips or notes as direct evidence, especially when the declarant's identity, perception, and state of mind at the time of the statement's creation cannot be established. Future cases will likely face greater scrutiny regarding the foundational proof of inherent trustworthiness for anonymous hearsay.
