United States v. Bryant
579 U.S. 140, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3775, 195 L. Ed. 2d 317 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
An uncounseled tribal-court conviction, valid under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) because it did not impose a sentence exceeding one year and thus did not trigger a federal constitutional right to counsel, can be used as a predicate offense to enhance punishment in a subsequent federal prosecution without violating the Sixth Amendment.
Facts:
- Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) in 2005 to address high rates of domestic violence against Native American women, making it a federal crime for a person to commit domestic assault in Indian country if they have at least two prior domestic violence convictions from federal, state, or tribal courts.
- Michael Bryant, Jr., an enrolled member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, resided on the Tribe's reservation in Montana.
- Between 1997 and 2007, Bryant pleaded guilty on at least five occasions in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court to misdemeanor domestic assault, including incidents where he hit one live-in girlfriend on the head with a beer bottle and attempted to strangle her, and beat a different girlfriend, kneeing her in the face, breaking her nose, and leaving her bruised and bloodied.
- For most of these tribal-court convictions, Bryant was sentenced to terms of imprisonment, none exceeding one year, and he was indigent and was not appointed counsel in these proceedings.
- In February 2011, Bryant attacked his then-girlfriend, dragging her off the bed, pulling her hair, and repeatedly punching and kicking her, admitting later to law enforcement that he had physically assaulted her five or six times.
- Three months later, Bryant assaulted another woman with whom he was then living, waking her by yelling and then choking her until she almost lost consciousness, later stating he had assaulted her on three separate occasions.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury in Montana indicted Michael Bryant, Jr. on two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a), based on 2011 assaults and his multiple prior tribal-court convictions.
- Bryant moved in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana to dismiss the indictment, contending that the Sixth Amendment precluded use of his prior, uncounseled, tribal-court misdemeanor convictions to satisfy the predicate-offense element of § 117(a).
- The District Court denied Bryant's motion.
- Bryant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the District Court's decision, and was subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms of 46 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be followed by three years of supervised release.
- Bryant appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Bryant as appellant, United States as appellee).
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction and directed dismissal of the indictment, holding that tribal-court convictions may be used in subsequent federal prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right to counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right.
- The Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc, despite vigorous dissents.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari (United States as petitioner/appellant).
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment prohibit the use of uncounseled tribal-court convictions, which were valid under the Indian Civil Rights Act, as predicate offenses to enhance punishment in a subsequent federal prosecution for domestic assault by a habitual offender?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No, the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit the use of uncounseled tribal-court convictions, valid under ICRA, as predicate offenses to enhance punishment in a subsequent federal prosecution for domestic assault by a habitual offender. The Court reasoned that Bryant’s tribal-court convictions did not violate the Sixth Amendment when obtained because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal-court proceedings. Instead, tribal-court proceedings are governed by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), which requires appointed counsel for indigent defendants only if a sentence of more than one year's imprisonment is imposed. Since Bryant's sentences in tribal court did not exceed one year, his convictions were valid when entered under ICRA. Relying on Nichols v. United States, the Court affirmed that convictions valid when entered — even if uncounseled for misdemeanor offenses not resulting in imprisonment (in Nichols) or for tribal-court convictions not triggering a Sixth Amendment right (here) — retain their validity for use in subsequent proceedings to enhance punishment. The Court explained that enhancement statutes punish the most recent offense, not the prior convictions themselves. The Court rejected the argument that reliability concerns should preclude their use, noting that ICRA’s due process requirements and habeas review ensure sufficient reliability, and distinguished Burgett v. Texas, which applies only when the initial conviction was constitutionally invalid due to a Sixth Amendment violation.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas concurred, agreeing that current precedents dictate that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the use of Bryant's uncounseled tribal-court convictions as predicates for the federal crime. However, Justice Thomas expressed doubt regarding the constitutional basis for three underlying assumptions in the case: (1) the Burgett rule that prior uncounseled convictions obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment cannot be used as predicates, suggesting Burgett was likely wrong; (2) the idea that tribes' retained sovereignty exempts their prosecutions from constitutional provisions like the Sixth Amendment; and (3) Congress's “plenary power” over Indian tribes, which allows it to enact federal criminal laws like § 117(a). He argued that the Court has failed to identify a sound constitutional basis for these assumptions and that it is time to reconsider precedents like Burgett and the "plenary power" doctrine rooted in United States v. Kagama, which he found paternalistic and ahistorical.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the reach of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in the context of tribal-court convictions used as predicate offenses in federal court. By affirming that tribal-court convictions valid under ICRA (which provides a less extensive right to counsel than the Sixth Amendment) can be used for sentencing enhancement, the Supreme Court reinforces the principle from Nichols v. United States that the validity of the prior conviction at its inception is key, rather than whether it would have been valid if tried in state or federal court. The decision supports Congress's efforts to address domestic violence in Indian country by enabling the use of tribal court records for federal habitual offender statutes, even if those records stem from uncounseled misdemeanors. It also implicitly upholds the distinct legal status and procedural requirements of tribal courts under ICRA.
