United States v. Broce et al.
488 U.S. 563 (1989)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A defendant who enters a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea to indictments that facially describe separate criminal offenses thereby relinquishes the opportunity to later challenge the resulting convictions on double jeopardy grounds through a collateral attack that would require introducing evidence outside the original record.
Facts:
- Ray C. Broce and Broce Construction Co., Inc. (Respondents) were involved in bidding for highway projects in Kansas.
- Around April 1978, Respondents entered into an agreement to rig bids on a specific highway project, which became the subject of a first indictment.
- Around July 1979, Respondents entered into a similar but separate agreement to rig bids on a different highway project, which became the subject of a second indictment.
- During plea negotiations for both indictments, Respondents acknowledged in plea agreements that they were subject to separate sentences on each conspiracy charged.
- In a separate case involving another company, Beachner Construction Co., a court later found that a single, overarching conspiracy to rig bids had permeated the Kansas highway construction industry for over 25 years, covering the time period of the Broce indictments.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States filed two separate indictments against Ray C. Broce and Broce Construction Co., Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas.
- Respondents pleaded guilty to both indictments, and the District Court entered judgments of conviction and imposed sentences.
- After the judgments became final, Respondents filed a motion in the same District Court to vacate their sentences on the second indictment, arguing a double jeopardy violation.
- The District Court denied the motion, finding the claim was foreclosed by the guilty pleas.
- Respondents appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which reversed in an en banc decision, holding the pleas did not waive the claim and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
- On remand, the District Court found a single conspiracy existed and vacated the conviction and sentence on the second indictment.
- The United States, as appellant, appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's vacatur of the conviction.
- The United States petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a defendant's voluntary and counseled guilty plea to two separate indictments, which on their face charge distinct conspiracies, foreclose a subsequent collateral attack on one of the convictions based on a double jeopardy claim that requires the introduction of new evidence to prove only one conspiracy existed?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
Yes. A defendant's voluntary guilty plea to indictments that facially charge distinct offenses forecloses a subsequent collateral attack on double jeopardy grounds that would require developing a new factual record. A guilty plea is not merely a confession to acts but an admission of guilt to the substantive crime charged, including all factual and legal elements. By pleading guilty to two indictments alleging distinct agreements—separated by time and involving different projects—Respondents conceded they committed two separate crimes. This concession relinquishes the right to a trial-type proceeding to prove otherwise. The exceptions established in Blackledge v. Perry and Menna v. New York do not apply here because those cases involved constitutional violations that were apparent on the face of the record, whereas Respondents' claim requires contradicting the indictments with new evidence, an opportunity foreclosed by their pleas.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
No. A guilty plea should not foreclose a later collateral attack based on a valid double jeopardy claim, even if an evidentiary hearing is required to prove that claim. The Double Jeopardy Clause is a fundamental constitutional protection that limits the government's power to prosecute, a power it does not gain simply because a defendant pleads guilty. The rule from Menna and Blackledge—that a guilty plea does not waive a challenge to the state's very authority to bring a charge—should not be limited to claims that are obvious without a hearing. The two indictments here were vague, overlapping, and by their nature suggested a single ongoing conspiracy, providing a sufficient basis for a double jeopardy claim that deserves a hearing on its merits.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Yes. The guilty pleas foreclose the claim. While joining the majority, the underlying premise of the respondents' double jeopardy claim is doubtful. Even if the two separate bid-rigging schemes were carried out in furtherance of a single, 25-year-long master conspiracy, it does not necessarily follow that each distinct scheme cannot be prosecuted as a separate crime. Each indictment alleged a complete and flagrant violation of the Sherman Act, and it would be perverse to assume that guilt of an even larger, ongoing crime should immunize a defendant from prosecution for the individual crimes committed.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the principle of finality for convictions based on guilty pleas. It narrows the exception from Menna and Blackledge, limiting post-plea collateral attacks to constitutional claims that are evident 'on the face of the record.' By foreclosing the introduction of new evidence to contradict the charges admitted in a plea, the Court places the onus on defendants to challenge the factual basis of multiple charges, such as arguing a single conspiracy, before pleading guilty. This holding makes it much more difficult for defendants who plead guilty to later benefit from new facts or legal theories that emerge in related cases.
Unlock the full brief for United States v. Broce et al.