United States v. Brandon Gravatt
Published Opinion (2020)
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Rule of Law:
The First Step Act of 2018 defines a "covered offense" as a violation of a federal criminal statute whose statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, and this definition includes multi-object conspiracy charges where at least one object's penalties were so modified, even if other objects were not modified and independently supported the sentence.
Facts:
- In 2001, Brandon Gravatt engaged in a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute both 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack cocaine.
- At the time of Gravatt's sentencing in May 2003, a conviction for possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of crack cocaine carried a minimum 10-year term and maximum life term under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846.
- Similarly, a conviction for possession with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine also carried a minimum 10-year term and maximum life term under the same statutes.
- The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 later increased the drug amounts triggering mandatory minimums for crack trafficking offenses, specifically modifying penalties for 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (50 grams or more of crack) and § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (5 grams or more of crack).
- The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 did not amend the penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) regarding powder cocaine.
- The First Step Act of 2018 made the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive for sentences imposed before August 3, 2010.
Procedural Posture:
- In 2001, Gravatt was indicted for, among other things, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack cocaine.
- Gravatt pled guilty under a written agreement to the dual-object drug conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. § 846.
- In May 2003, the district court (court of first instance) calculated Gravatt’s advisory guideline range as 292 to 365 months and sentenced him to 292 months in prison and 5 years of supervised release.
- In October 2015, following the Sentencing Commission's Amendment 782, Gravatt moved to modify his sentence, and the district court reduced his term of imprisonment to 260 months with 5 years of supervised release.
- After the First Step Act of 2018 was passed, Gravatt again moved to reduce his sentence under the Act.
- The district court denied Gravatt's motion, concluding he was not eligible for relief because his statutory penalty range of 10 years to life was independently supported by the powder cocaine offense, whose penalties were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act.
- Gravatt (appellant) filed a timely notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Does an offense of conviction that involves a multi-object drug conspiracy, where the statutory penalties for one object (crack cocaine) were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, qualify as a "covered offense" under the First Step Act of 2018, even if the penalties for another object (powder cocaine) were not modified and independently supported the original sentence?
Opinions:
Majority - Quattlebaum, Circuit Judge
Yes, an offense involving a multi-object drug conspiracy, where one object's statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, qualifies as a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, even if another object was not modified and independently supported the original sentence. The court, guided by its precedent in United States v. Wirsing and United States v. Venable, clarified that "eligibility" under the Act depends solely on the existence of a "covered offense." A "covered offense" is defined in Section 404(a) as "a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, that was committed before August 3, 2010." Gravatt's conviction for conspiracy to distribute 50 or more grams of crack cocaine falls under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), a statute whose penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. The court found nothing in the Act's text requiring that a defendant be convicted of only a single violation whose penalties were modified. The government's position, which would effectively impose an additional limitation, was rejected as it would expand the explicit limitations set forth in Section 404(c) of the Act. Therefore, because Gravatt's sentence involved a covered offense, he is eligible to have his motion considered on the merits, though the court's decision does not dictate the outcome of that merits review.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of "covered offense" under the First Step Act, particularly for multi-object conspiracy convictions. By rejecting an interpretation that would impose an additional "exclusivity" requirement, the Fourth Circuit ensures that more defendants serving sentences for crack cocaine offenses that were part of broader conspiracies are eligible for a discretionary sentence reduction. The ruling reinforces that eligibility is a threshold determination based on the statute of conviction, preventing district courts from prematurely denying motions based on other sentencing factors that are better addressed during the merits review. This broadens access to the Act's intended relief, aligning with Congress's goal of addressing crack-powder sentencing disparities.
