United States v. Bradford L. Lockett
90 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8474, 919 F.2d 585, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 1092 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
The exclusionary rule for a violation of the federal 'knock and announce' statute (18 U.S.C. § 3109) does not apply when a defendant's standing is based solely on the statute's secondary objective of preventing violence and property destruction, rather than a constitutionally-protected expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
Facts:
- In June 1987, the Portland Police Bureau began investigating cocaine trafficking, focusing on Bradford Lockett, Marcella Manning, and others, monitoring Lockett's activities for months.
- Police observed Lockett and Manning engaging in suspicious activities, including driving evasively to the airport, Manning taking flights to Los Angeles under an alias, and observing Manning packaging a controlled substance at 6237 North Montana Street in January 1988 while Lockett was present.
- In January 1988, Lockett and Marvina Allen attempted to buy a $50,000 cashier's check with cash, but left the bank when informed a currency transaction report was required, returning later with Charles Allen, who claimed ownership of the cash despite being unemployed.
- On January 25, 1988, Lockett purchased a house for $75,000, initially offering cash but using cashier's checks when told IRS forms would be necessary.
- On February 6, 1988, Lockett and Marcella Manning were observed leaving 129 Northeast Thompson Street, delivering a bag elsewhere, visiting 6237 North Montana Street, and returning to the Thompson Street residence, where numerous individuals were seen quickly visiting and leaving.
- At 7:13 p.m. that evening, Officer Jacobelli knocked on the door of the Thompson Street residence, announced police presence and a search warrant, and after four to five seconds without response, officers forcibly entered.
- Inside, officers found Lockett, Marcella Manning, and Carla Manning, along with approximately 1,800 grams of cocaine (much of it packaged), a cooking pot, cigarette lighters, Lockett's leather jacket, and a paging device.
- A subsequent search of Lockett’s residence, which he shared with his parents, revealed $25,000 in currency.
Procedural Posture:
- Bradford Lockett was tried in a federal district court for drug-related crimes, during which he moved to suppress evidence, arguing a violation of the 'knock and announce' rule.
- The district court denied Lockett's motion to suppress.
- A jury in the district court convicted Lockett on four counts: conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, distribution of 500 grams or more of cocaine, and possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute.
- Lockett appealed his convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a defendant, whose only interest in challenging an alleged violation of the federal 'knock and announce' statute (18 U.S.C. § 3109) is based on the statute's safety rationale and not a legitimate expectation of privacy, have standing to obtain the suppression of evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - O’Scannlain, Circuit Judge
No, a defendant whose sole standing to challenge an alleged 'knock and announce' violation is based on the statute's safety rationale, and not a constitutionally-protected privacy interest, is not entitled to the suppression of evidence. The court noted that to have standing under 18 U.S.C. § 3109, a person must be among those protected by the statute, whose purposes include reducing violence, preventing property destruction, and protecting privacy. Lockett failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Thompson Street residence because he did not reside there, hold a proprietary interest, or show 'joint control and supervision,' beyond mere presence or involvement in a criminal venture. While Lockett might have had a safety interest due to his presence, the remedy of suppression is typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights, primarily the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy. The court reasoned that since § 3109’s safety objective differs from the Fourth Amendment’s primary privacy purpose, a person whose standing relies solely on this non-constitutional safety interest should not receive the same remedy as someone whose standing is based on constitutionally-protected privacy concerns. Citing United States v. Payner, the court cautioned against overusing suppression for illegalities that do not infringe a defendant’s constitutional rights.
Concurring - Fernandez, Circuit Judge
No, a defendant whose only interest in challenging an alleged violation of the federal 'knock and announce' statute (18 U.S.C. § 3109) is based on the statute's safety rationale and not a legitimate expectation of privacy, does not have standing to obtain the suppression of evidence because the Fourth Amendment itself encompasses the safety concerns. Justice Fernandez concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the majority’s reasoning on standing. He argued that the Fourth Amendment is broader than just privacy, asserting that the safety aspects of the 'knock and announce' rule are as fundamental to the Fourth Amendment as privacy, protecting against the fear and danger of forced entries by government agents. He cited historical sources like Sir Edward Coke and Justice Story to support the view that the Fourth Amendment protects 'personal security, personal liberty and private property.' Therefore, he believed that if Lockett lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment (which the panel agreed upon), he should not have separate standing under § 3109, as the statute’s protections are coextensive with the Fourth Amendment’s broader scope.
Analysis:
This case significantly refines the application of the exclusionary rule for violations of the 'knock and announce' statute, distinguishing between constitutional privacy interests and statutory safety interests. By limiting suppression to only those instances where a defendant's constitutionally-protected privacy is infringed, the ruling narrows the scope of the exclusionary rule, making it harder for defendants to suppress evidence based solely on a technical 'knock and announce' violation if they lack a strong privacy interest in the searched premises. This distinction forces future courts to carefully evaluate the precise nature of the right violated and the defendant's connection to that right before imposing the severe remedy of evidence suppression.
