United States v. Booker
543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)
Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find any fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to enhance a sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines beyond the range authorized by the jury's verdict. To remedy the unconstitutionality of the Guidelines' mandatory nature, the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act making them mandatory are severed, rendering the Guidelines effectively advisory.
Facts:
- Freddie J. Booker was charged with possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine; a jury found him guilty based on evidence he possessed 92.5 grams.
- At a separate sentencing hearing, a federal judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker had actually possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and had also obstructed justice.
- Ducan Fanfan was charged with conspiracy to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine, and a jury convicted him on that basis.
- At Fanfan's sentencing hearing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Fanfan was responsible for a much larger quantity of drugs (2.5 kg of cocaine and 261.6 g of crack) and was a leader in the criminal enterprise.
Procedural Posture:
- In Booker's case, he was convicted by a jury in U.S. District Court. The judge made additional factual findings at sentencing that substantially increased the mandatory sentence beyond the range supported by the jury's verdict.
- Booker appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which is an intermediate appellate court. The Seventh Circuit held the sentence was unconstitutional and remanded for resentencing.
- In Fanfan's case, he was convicted by a jury in U.S. District Court. The judge, acknowledging the recent Blakely decision, refused to enhance Fanfan's sentence based on judicially-found facts and imposed a sentence based only on the jury's verdict.
- The Government appealed the sentence in Fanfan's case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
- The Government filed petitions for a writ of certiorari in both cases to the U.S. Supreme Court, which is the highest court. The Supreme Court granted the petitions, including certiorari before judgment in Fanfan's case, and consolidated the cases for review.
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial prohibit a judge from enhancing a defendant's sentence under the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines based on facts (other than a prior conviction) not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens (on the constitutional issue) and Justice Breyer (on the remedy)
Yes. The application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. Under the rule established in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington, any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the maximum sentence authorized solely by the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which are mandatory and have the force of law, require judges to impose higher sentences based on facts they find by a preponderance of the evidence. This system is constitutionally indistinguishable from the state system struck down in Blakely. The proper remedy for this constitutional violation is to sever and excise the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that make the Guidelines mandatory (18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)) and that set the corresponding standard for appellate review (§ 3742(e)). This modification renders the Guidelines effectively advisory, requiring judges to consider them but permitting them to tailor sentences in light of other statutory factors. Sentences will now be reviewed on appeal for unreasonableness.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes, but the remedy is wrong. While the Court is correct that the mandatory Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment, its remedial choice to make the entire system advisory is an inappropriate exercise of legislative power. Congress repeatedly and explicitly rejected an advisory system. The proper, more restrained remedy would be to preserve the mandatory nature of the Guidelines but require any sentence-enhancing facts to be charged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This approach would fix the constitutional defect while respecting congressional intent and affecting a much smaller number of cases.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
No. The Court's constitutional holding is incorrect. The Sixth Amendment does not require sentencing facts to be found by a jury. Historically, juries have determined the elements of a crime, while judges have found facts about the manner in which the crime was committed to determine the appropriate sentence within a statutory range. The Apprendi and Blakely decisions were a departure from this long-standing tradition and should not be extended to invalidate the administrative Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were created to combat sentencing disparity.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes, but the remedy is wrong. The majority's decision to discard the provisions that eliminate discretionary sentencing in order to save a statute designed to eliminate discretionary sentencing is wonderfully ironic. By making the Guidelines advisory and inventing a vague 'unreasonableness' standard of appellate review, the Court has created a system that will restore the very sentencing disparities the Sentencing Reform Act was meant to eliminate. It has surgically removed the statute's purpose from its text, leaving a confusing and unworkable regime in its place.
Analysis:
This decision fundamentally reshaped federal criminal sentencing, ending the nearly two-decade era of mandatory guidelines. By rendering the Guidelines advisory, the Court restored significant discretion to district judges but also created new challenges for achieving sentencing uniformity, the primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act. The ruling established 'reasonableness' as the new standard for appellate review, launching an evolving body of case law to define its meaning. The decision significantly impacts prosecutorial charging decisions, plea bargaining dynamics, and the overall balance of power in the federal criminal justice system.
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