United States v. Bonds
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11934, 608 F.3d 495, 83 Fed. R. Serv. 23 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
For a declarant's out-of-court statement to be admissible against a party-opponent as non-hearsay under an agency theory (FRE 801(d)(2)(D)), the proponent must establish a principal-agent relationship by a preponderance of the evidence, which requires showing the principal exercised a sufficient degree of control over the agent. Mere performance of a task, without evidence of control or specific authority to speak (FRE 801(d)(2)(C)), is insufficient to create such a relationship.
Facts:
- Barry Bonds was a professional baseball player who employed Greg Anderson as a personal trainer beginning in 1998.
- Anderson provided Bonds with various substances, including creams, oils, and nutritional supplements.
- On multiple occasions between 2000 and 2003, Bonds provided Anderson with blood and urine samples.
- Bonds testified that he believed the samples were for nutritional analysis and that his personal doctor drew the blood and gave the vials to Anderson at Bonds's home.
- Anderson then delivered these samples to BALCO Laboratories for testing.
- When delivering the samples to BALCO employee James Valente, Anderson identified them as belonging to Barry Bonds.
- Bonds paid Anderson $15,000 annually for his services and, in 2001, gave him a gift of $20,000.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government indicted Barry Bonds in the U.S. District Court (trial court) on charges of making false statements to a grand jury and obstruction of justice.
- Prior to trial, Bonds filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence, including testimony from BALCO employee James Valente about statements made by Bonds's trainer, Greg Anderson.
- The government contended Anderson’s statements identifying Bonds's samples were admissible under hearsay exemptions FRE 801(d)(2)(C) (authorized admission) and 801(d)(2)(D) (agent's admission).
- The district court granted Bonds's motion, finding the government failed to establish that Anderson was an authorized speaker or an agent, and thus his statements were inadmissible hearsay.
- The government, as appellant, filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court's evidentiary ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with Bonds as appellee.
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Issue:
Do out-of-court statements made by an athletic trainer identifying his client's biological samples to a laboratory employee fall under the hearsay exemptions for statements by an authorized person (FRE 801(d)(2)(C)) or by a party's agent (FRE 801(d)(2)(D))?
Opinions:
Majority - Schroeder, Circuit Judge
No. The trainer's statements are not admissible under the hearsay exemptions for authorized or agent statements. The government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Bonds authorized Anderson to speak on his behalf or that an agency relationship existed. For an authorized statement under FRE 801(d)(2)(C), there was no evidence that Bonds explicitly or implicitly authorized Anderson to identify the samples by name; the task could have been accomplished anonymously. For an agency relationship under FRE 801(d)(2)(D), the record showed Anderson was an independent contractor, and more importantly, there was no evidence that Bonds directed or controlled Anderson's activities, which is the essential element of agency. Bonds's passive accommodation of Anderson's requests did not establish the requisite control to form a principal-agent relationship.
Dissenting - Bea, Circuit Judge
Yes. The trainer's statements should be admitted as non-hearsay party admissions. The district court and majority erred by focusing on Anderson's general role as a trainer instead of the specific task Bonds entrusted to him: to get his samples tested and report the results. To accomplish this task accurately, identifying the source of the samples was necessary and therefore impliedly authorized under FRE 801(d)(2)(C). Furthermore, Anderson was acting as Bonds's agent for this specific task, and his statements identifying the samples were related to a matter within the scope of that agency, making them admissible under FRE 801(d)(2)(D). The district court committed a legal error by incorrectly holding that independent contractors cannot be agents for the purpose of this rule.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the evidentiary requirements for establishing agency under the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly in informal relationships. The court's emphasis on the principal's right of control sets a high bar for prosecutors seeking to admit statements from intermediaries who are not formal employees. The ruling underscores that merely entrusting someone with a task does not automatically grant them authority to speak or create an agency relationship for hearsay purposes. This precedent makes it more difficult to introduce incriminating statements from third parties in conspiracy or criminal enterprise cases unless a clear chain of command and control can be established.
