United States v. Bonds
784 F.3d 582 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
A single, evasive, and non-responsive but truthful statement made to a grand jury does not constitute a material obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 unless the statement, viewed in context, has a natural tendency or is capable of influencing the grand jury's investigation.
Facts:
- A federal grand jury was investigating the distribution of performance-enhancing drugs by BALCO Laboratories to professional athletes.
- One of the primary targets of the criminal investigation was Greg Anderson, the personal fitness trainer for professional baseball player Barry Bonds.
- Bonds was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony and was called to testify before the grand jury regarding his suspected use of steroids and his relationship with Anderson.
- During his testimony, a prosecutor asked Bonds the direct question: "Did Greg ever give you anything that required a syringe to inject yourself with?"
- In response, Bonds did not directly answer but instead gave a rambling monologue about his friendship with Anderson, his status as a "celebrity child" with a famous father, and his general policy of not getting into other people's business.
Procedural Posture:
- Barry Bonds was indicted by a federal grand jury on four counts of making false statements and one count of obstruction of justice.
- Following a trial in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (trial court), a jury convicted Bonds on the single count of obstruction of justice.
- The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the four false statement counts.
- Bonds filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal on the obstruction conviction, which the district court denied.
- Bonds, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently granted a rehearing en banc to reconsider the panel's decision.
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Issue:
Does a single, rambling, and non-responsive but truthful statement made by a witness to a grand jury constitute a material obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A rambling, non-responsive answer to a simple question does not constitute obstruction of justice where there is insufficient evidence that the statement was material. Whatever the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 may be in other circumstances, the defendant's conviction here is not supported by the record because the government failed to prove materiality. Because the reversal is for insufficient evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial on this count.
Concurring - Kozinski
No. A single non-responsive answer cannot support an obstruction of justice conviction in this context. The obstruction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, is dangerously broad and must be limited by a materiality requirement to avoid chilling zealous advocacy and criminalizing common litigation behavior. A statement is material only if it has the intrinsic capability to influence the decision-making body. Bonds's statement about being a 'celebrity child' was wholly impertinent to the investigation and could not have influenced the grand jury. While a persistent pattern of evasiveness might be material, one isolated, irrelevant answer is not.
Concurring - N.R. Smith
No. A single truthful but evasive statement cannot be a material obstruction of justice. Citing the principles from the perjury case Bronston v. United States, the burden is on the questioner to 'pin the witness down' and clarify unresponsive answers. The natural effect of a single evasive statement is not to impede justice but to prompt follow-up questions from the prosecutor, which is precisely what occurred here. For evasive testimony to be material, it must be so persistent that it effectively amounts to a refusal to testify and closes off an entire avenue of inquiry, which did not happen.
Concurring - Reinhardt
No. A single non-responsive answer by a grand jury witness can never support a conviction for obstruction of justice. The statement was non-responsive and therefore non-material. The proper remedy for such an answer is for the prosecutor to press the witness for a direct answer, not to bring a criminal charge. Further, § 1503 should not apply to in-court testimony at all; such conduct is more appropriately handled by perjury or contempt statutes.
Concurring - W. Fletcher
No. The conviction should be reversed not on materiality grounds, but because the statute has been fundamentally misinterpreted. The word 'corruptly' in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 does not refer to a defendant's intent or state of mind, but rather to a specific forbidden means of obstruction, namely bribery. The government’s broad reading of the statute would criminalize ordinary and necessary litigation tactics. Interpreting 'corruptly' to mean bribery aligns the statute's text and history and avoids the nonsensical result of punishing a truthful but evasive statement more harshly than outright perjury.
Dissenting - Rawlinson
Yes. The jury's verdict that the statement was a material obstruction of justice was supported by sufficient evidence and should be upheld. The majority and concurrences improperly substitute their judgment for the jury's, failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The jury heard testimony that Bonds’s evasiveness forced investigators to pursue additional lines of inquiry, thereby impeding the administration of justice. The concurrences' reliance on the perjury case Bronston v. United States is misplaced, as the obstruction statute is broader and criminalizes any corrupt 'endeavor' to impede justice, whether successful or not.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the application of the federal obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, to witness testimony. By rigorously applying the materiality standard to a single evasive answer, the court establishes a high bar for prosecutors, preventing them from using the statute's broad language to criminalize common, if unhelpful, witness behavior like non-responsiveness or rambling. The various concurrences provide future defendants with powerful arguments, emphasizing the prosecutor's duty to clarify ambiguous answers and questioning whether the statute was ever intended to cover testimonial conduct short of bribery. This ruling protects witnesses from the chilling effect of potential prosecution for testimonial mishaps and reinforces the distinct functions of statutes governing obstruction, perjury, and contempt.
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