United States v. Board of Education
911 F.2d 882, 1990 WL 112500 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
An employer demonstrates 'undue hardship' under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by showing that accommodating a religious practice would require violating an apparently valid criminal statute or sacrificing a compelling state interest, such as maintaining religious neutrality in public schools.
Facts:
- Alima Delores Reardon, a devout Muslim, holds a religiously-based conviction that Muslim women should cover their entire body, except face and hands, when in public.
- Since 1970, Reardon worked as a substitute and full-time teacher in the Philadelphia School District, holding the necessary certification and qualifications.
- In 1982, Reardon embraced her religious conviction regarding dress and subsequently wore a head scarf covering her head, neck, and bosom, and a long loose dress covering her arms, while teaching.
- Reardon taught in this attire without incident until late 1984.
- In late 1984, on three separate occasions, principals of various schools informed Reardon that, pursuant to state law, she could not teach in her religious clothing.
- These actions were taken in compliance with Pennsylvania’s “Garb Statute,” 24 Pa.St.Ann. § 11-1112, enacted in 1895 and reenacted in 1949, which prohibits teachers from wearing any dress, mark, emblem, or insignia indicating religious affiliation while on duty.
- The Garb Statute stipulates penalties for violations, including suspension for teachers and fines and deprivation of office for school directors who fail to comply.
- On each occasion, Reardon refused to change her attire and was not allowed to teach.
Procedural Posture:
- After exhausting internal school system remedies, Alima Delores Reardon filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- The EEOC District Office conducted an investigation and concluded there was reasonable cause to believe the School Board and the Commonwealth had violated Title VII.
- After unsuccessful conciliation efforts, the EEOC transmitted Reardon's charge to the Department of Justice, as the respondent was a governmental agency.
- The Justice Department filed a complaint in federal district court, naming both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia as defendants.
- After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the United States and against the School Board, ordering Reardon to be made whole and enjoining the Board from enforcing the Garb Statute.
- The district court entered judgment in favor of the Commonwealth, concluding it was not Reardon's 'employer' under Title VII and that there was no 'pattern or practice' of discrimination.
- The United States appealed the judgment in favor of the Commonwealth (United States is the appellant).
- The Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia cross-appealed the judgment against it (Board is the cross-appellant).
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Issue:
Does an employer, including a state and its school board, demonstrate 'undue hardship' under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby excusing it from accommodating a public school teacher's religious practice of wearing religious garb, when state law prohibits such attire and the state has a compelling interest in religious neutrality in public schools?
Opinions:
Majority - Stapleton, Circuit Judge
Yes, an employer, including a state and its school board, demonstrates 'undue hardship' under Title VII when a state law prohibits religious garb in public schools and the state has a compelling interest in maintaining religious neutrality. The court determined that Title VII's definition of 'religion' (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)) includes an exception where an employer cannot reasonably accommodate a religious practice without 'undue hardship,' which Trans World Airlines v. Hardison defined as requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost. The court found Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4J, a case upholding an Oregon religious garb statute whose appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court for want of a substantial federal question, to be controlling precedent. Cooper established that a state has a 'compelling state interest' in maintaining the appearance of religious neutrality in public school classrooms. Regarding the School Board, the court concluded that requiring it to accommodate Reardon would force its administrators to violate an apparently valid criminal statute (the Pennsylvania Garb Statute), exposing them to substantial risk of criminal prosecution, fines, and expulsion. This risk was found to be an 'undue hardship,' an a fortiori extension from Hardison's holding regarding collective bargaining agreements. Regarding the Commonwealth, the court agreed it was not Reardon's 'employer' for direct Title VII liability. However, for a 'pattern or practice of resistance' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), the Commonwealth could be liable if the Garb Statute itself conflicted with Title VII. The court reasoned that since Cooper authoritatively established the compelling state interest in religious neutrality, and the Pennsylvania Garb Statute had the same objective and was similarly tailored, accommodating Reardon would require the Commonwealth to sacrifice this compelling state interest, which constitutes an undue hardship. The court dismissed the argument that anti-Catholic animus from the 1895 enactment was relevant, given the statute's reenactment in 1949 and its non-discriminatory application to all religious attire, serving the compelling state interest in religious neutrality. Therefore, neither defendant was liable under Title VII.
Concurring - Harold A. Ackerman, District Judge
While concurring in the judgment, Judge Ackerman disagreed with the majority's reasoning for both defendants. He argued that the Board's 'undue hardship' defense, based on the risk of criminal prosecution for violating the Garb Statute, was weak because there was 'little in the record to indicate that the penal section...was being enforced.' He expressed concern that such a ruling could allow legislatures to effectively insulate statutes from review by appending unenforced penal sections. He also strongly disagreed with the majority's reliance on the Supreme Court's summary dismissal in Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4J as authoritative precedent. He cited scholarly concerns about the limited precedential value of such dismissals, especially when the full record is not available and when the decision arguably breaks new ground or rests on state constitutional grounds, as he believed Cooper did. He further noted that the Oregon Supreme Court in Cooper explicitly declined to address the Title VII issue, making it problematic to infer a Title VII non-violation from that case's reasoning. Instead, Judge Ackerman proposed that accommodating Ms. Reardon by allowing her to teach in religious garb would constitute an 'undue hardship' for both defendants because it would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, specifically the 'primary effect' prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test (that the statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion). He reasoned that allowing teachers to wear religious garb in public elementary schools, where students are impressionable and teachers are powerful role models, would convey a message that the state favors or prefers religion over nonreligion, thus appearing to endorse religion. He concluded that a violation of the First Amendment is more than a de minimis effect and therefore constitutes undue hardship under Title VII.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of 'undue hardship' under Title VII when a state's statutory prohibitions on religious attire in public schools are involved. By leveraging a Supreme Court summary dismissal of a Free Exercise Clause challenge, the Third Circuit effectively established a compelling state interest in maintaining religious neutrality in classrooms as a valid defense for employers under Title VII's accommodation requirement. This decision reinforces the difficulty for plaintiffs to overcome an 'undue hardship' defense when state statutes are implicated, particularly those addressing sensitive areas like religion in education, and highlights the tension between free exercise and establishment clause principles in public employment.
