United States v. Bass
404 U.S. 336 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
When a federal criminal statute is ambiguous, it should be resolved in favor of lenity and interpreted narrowly to avoid significantly altering the federal-state balance unless Congress provides a clear statement of its intent to do so.
Facts:
- The respondent, a resident of New York, had previously been convicted of a felony in a New York State court.
- On one occasion after his felony conviction, the respondent possessed a pistol.
- On a separate occasion, the respondent possessed a shotgun.
- No evidence was presented that the respondent's possession of either firearm had any connection to interstate commerce.
Procedural Posture:
- The respondent was prosecuted by the United States in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The indictment did not allege, and the prosecution made no attempt to show, that the firearm possession was 'in commerce or affecting commerce.'
- A jury convicted the respondent.
- The respondent moved for an arrest of judgment, arguing the statute required a commerce nexus which the government failed to prove; the trial court denied the motion.
- The respondent (as appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding the statute required a commerce nexus.
- The United States (as petitioner) petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the U.S. Supreme Court granted.
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Issue:
Does Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a), prohibit a convicted felon from merely possessing a firearm without the government also proving that the possession was 'in commerce or affecting commerce'?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
No. Title VII of the Act does not prohibit the mere possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; the statutory phrase 'in commerce or affecting commerce' qualifies the offenses of both possession and receipt, requiring the government to prove a nexus to interstate commerce as an element of the crime. The statute is ambiguous, as both the government's broad reading and the respondent's narrow reading are plausible based on the text and legislative history. Given this ambiguity, the Court applies two principles of statutory construction. First, the rule of lenity dictates that ambiguity in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant to ensure fair warning and that legislatures, not courts, define criminal conduct. Second, because making the mere possession of a firearm a federal crime would mark a major intrusion into the traditional police powers of the States, the Court will not assume Congress intended to alter the federal-state balance without a clear statement to that effect. As Congress did not 'plainly and unmistakably' make mere possession a federal crime, the narrower reading is adopted.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
Yes. The statute was intended to and does reach all possessions and receipts of firearms by convicted felons, regardless of any connection to interstate commerce. The plain text and punctuation of the statute indicate that the phrase 'in commerce or affecting commerce' modifies only the word 'transports.' Congressional findings and the legislative history, particularly the statements of the bill's sponsor, Senator Long, clearly demonstrate an intent to prohibit every possession of a firearm by a felon based on the finding that such possession inherently burdens commerce. The majority's narrow reading renders the statute largely duplicative of another provision, Title IV, and ignores Congress's clear purpose to enact a broad prohibition.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant canon of statutory interpretation, often called the 'federalism clear statement rule,' which holds that courts will not interpret a federal statute to intrude upon areas of traditional state sovereignty, like general criminal law, unless Congress makes its intent to do so unmistakably clear. It strongly reaffirms the rule of lenity in the context of federal criminal statutes. The case demonstrates the Court's reluctance to expand federal police power at the expense of the states through statutory interpretation, a principle that foreshadowed later, more direct limitations on Congress's Commerce Clause power in cases like United States v. Lopez.
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