No. The prosecutors don't have to prove what the sellers knew. Usually, for a crime, you have to have a 'guilty mind,' but this law is different. It's a 'public safety' law designed to protect people from dangerous drugs. To make the law effective, Congress put the full responsibility on sellers to know what they are selling. It's their job to find out. The court decided it's better to punish a careless seller than to risk dangerous drugs getting out to the public.

No, you do not need to know that the drugs you are selling are illegal to be guilty under this law. The Supreme Court decided that the purpose of the law is to control dangerous drugs and protect people's safety, not just to punish criminals. The law wants to make sure that anyone selling drugs is very careful and checks to see if the drugs are legal. The Court said that protecting people from dangerous drugs is more important than worrying about whether the person selling the drugs knew they were illegal. So, the Supreme Court said the lower court was wrong to dismiss the charges.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <opinion type="majority"> <author id="b297-15"> Mr. Chief Justice Taft </author> delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of error to the District Court under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. Defendants in error were indicted for a violation of the Narcotic Act of December 17, 1914, c. 1, 38'Stat. 785. The indictment charged them with unlawfully selling to another a certain amount of a derivative of opium and a certain amount of a derivative of coca leaves, not in pursuance of any written order on a form issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, contrary to the provisions of § 2 of the act. The defendants demurred to the indictment on the ground that it failed to charge that they had sold the inhibited drugs knowing them to be such. The statute does not make such knowledge an element of the offense. The District Court sustained the demurrer and quashéd the indictment. The correctness of this ruling is the question before us. While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did *252 riot in teriris include it (Reg. v. Sleep, 8 Cox C. C. 472), thfere has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement.. It is a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court. It has been objected that punishment of a person for an act in violation of law when ignorant of the facts making it so, is an- absence of due process of law. But that objection is considered and overruled in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57, 69, 70, in which it was held that in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts, the State may in the maintenance of a public policy provide " that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance.” Many instances of this are to be found in.regulatory measures in the exercise of what is called the police power where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement' of' some social betterment rather than the punishment of .the crimes as in cases of mala in se. Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141; Commonwealth v. Smith, 166 Mass. 370; Commonwealth v. Hallett, 103 Mass. 452; People v. Kibler, 106 N. Y. 321; State v. Kinkead, 57 Conn. 173; McCutcheon v. People, 69 Ill. 601; State v. Thompson, 74 Ia. 119; United States v. Leathers, 6 Sawy. 17; United States v. Thomson, 12 Fed 245; United States v. Mayfield, 1 77 Fed. 765; United States v. 36 Bottles of Gin, 210 Fed. 271; Feeley v. United States, 236 Fed. 903; Voves v. United States, 249 Fed. 191. So, too, in the collection of taxes, the importance to the public of their collection leads the legislature to impose on-the,taxpayer the'burden of finding out the facts upon which Jiis liability to pay depends and meeting it at the peril of punishment. Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. &amp; W. 404; Bruhn v. Rex, [1909] A. C. 317. Again where one deals with others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to them, as in selling diseased food or poison, the *253 policy of’ the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require the punishment of the negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells. Hobbs v. Winchester Corporation, [1910] 2 K. B. 471, 483. The question before us, therefore, is one of the construction of the statute and of inference of the intent of Congress. ’ The Narcotic Act has been held by this court to be a taxing act with the incidental purpose of minimizing the spread of addiction to the use of poisonous and demoralizing drugs. United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 94; United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 402. Section 2 of the Narcotic Act, 38 Stat. 786, we give in part in the margin. <a class="footnote" href="#fn1" id="fn1_ref"> 1 </a> It is very evident from a reading of *254 it that the emphasis, of the section is in securing a close supervision of the business of dealing in these- dangerous drugs by the taxing officers of the Government and that it merely uses a criminal penalty to secure recorded evidence of the disposition of such drugs as a means of taxing and restraining the traffic. Its manifest purpose is to require every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute, and if he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him. Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an- innocent-seller to a penalty against the evil of -exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably .to be. avoided. Doubtless considerations as to the' opportunity of the seller to find out the fact and the difficulty of proof of knowledge contributed to this conclusion. We think the demurrer to the- indictment should have been overruled. Judgment reversed. <judges id="APU"> Mr. Justice Clarke took no part in this decision. </judges> <div class="footnotes"><div class="footnote" id="fn1" label="1"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn1_ref"> 1 </a> Part of § 2 of an act entitled An Act To provide for the registration of, with collectors of internal revenue, and to impose a special tax upon all persons who produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, or preparations, and for other purposes, approved December 17, 1914, 38 Stat. 785, 786: Sec. 2. That it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of the aforesaid drugs except in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Every person who shall accept any such order, and in pursuance thereof shall sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of the aforesaid drugs, shall preserve such order for a period of two years in such a way as to be readily accessible to inspection by any officer, agent, or employee of the Treasury Department duly authorized for that purpose, and the State, Territorial, District, municipal, and insular officials named in section five of this Act. Every person'who shall give an o’der as herein provided to any other person for any of the aforesaid “drugs shall, at or before the time of giving such order, make or cause to be made a duplicate thereof on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and in case of the acceptance of such order, shall preserve such duplicate for said, period of two years in such a way as to be readily accessible’ to inspection by the officers, agents, employees, and officials hereinbefore mentioned. </div></div></opinion>

"While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes, even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it... there has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by …

"Many instances of this are to be found in regulatory measures in the exercise of what is called the police power where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se."

Its manifest purpose is to require every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute, and if he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him.

The United States Supreme Court has held that legislatures may make the commission of an act a criminal offense even in the absence of criminal intent

The first is that "determining the mental state required for commission of a federal crime requires `construction of the statute and... inference of the intent of Congress.'"

Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided.

"[I] n the prohibition or punishment of particular acts," the Court reasoned, the legislature may "in the maintenance of a public policy provide `that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance.'"

—holding that the illegal sale of narcotics constituted a public welfare offense and that strict liability was appropriate

—upholding against a due process challenge the Narcotic Act of 1914, which lacked a knowledge requirement (deliberately, as the Court found), and declining to read one into the statute

In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.

No. A violation of the Narcotic Act of 1914 does not require the prosecution to prove the defendant knew they were selling an inhibited drug. While common law traditionally required scienter as an element of every crime, this rule has been modified for statutory public welfare offenses where such a requirement would obstruct the legislative purpose. The Narcotic Act is a taxing measure with the goal of preventing the spread of dangerous drugs. To achieve this, Congress intended to place the burden on sellers to ascertain at their peril whether the products they sell are prohibited. The law prioritizes protecting the public from dangerous substances over the potential injustice of penalizing a seller who is ignorant of the drug's character.

No, knowledge that the drugs sold are illegal is not a necessary element for conviction under the Narcotic Act because the statute is a regulatory measure aimed at controlling the spread of drug addiction and protecting public welfare. I conclude that Congress weighed the potential injustice of punishing sellers who might be ignorant of the drugs' legal status against the need to protect innocent purchasers from dangerous drugs, and determined that the latter interest was more important. The Act imposes strict liability, requiring sellers to ascertain at their own peril whether their actions comply with the law. This interpretation is supported by the lack of an explicit mens rea requirement in the statute, as well as the emphasis on close supervision of the drug trade by taxing officers. Therefore, I hold that the District Court erred in sustaining the demurrer, and the judgment is reversed.

United States v. Balint

Premium Feature

Rule of Law:

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

Premium Content

Issue:

Opinions:

Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Taft

Analysis: