United States v. Baker
807 F.2d 427 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2320, does not require the prosecution to prove the defendant knew their conduct was criminal; it only requires proof that the defendant intentionally trafficked in goods and knowingly used a counterfeit mark.
Facts:
- Paul Baker dealt in watches.
- The watches Baker sold bore a counterfeit "Rolex" trademark.
- Baker intentionally dealt in these watches.
- Baker admitted that he knew the watches were counterfeit at the time he sold them.
- Baker asserted that he did not know that trafficking in counterfeit goods was a criminal offense.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States prosecuted Paul Baker in federal district court for trafficking in counterfeit goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320.
- Baker filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that knowledge of criminality was an element of the offense, which the district court denied.
- At trial, the district court refused Baker's request for a jury instruction that he could not be convicted if he did not have the purpose to 'disobey or disregard the law.'
- A jury found Baker guilty of the charged offense.
- Baker, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with the United States as appellee.
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Issue:
Does a conviction under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2320, require the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew their conduct of trafficking in counterfeit goods was illegal?
Opinions:
Majority - Reavley
No. A conviction under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 does not require proof that the defendant knew their conduct was illegal. The plain language of the statute and its legislative history clearly establish that only two mental states are required for conviction: the defendant must (1) intentionally traffic in goods and (2) knowingly use a counterfeit mark in connection with those goods. The statute's text is unambiguous and does not suggest a third mental state requirement regarding knowledge of criminality. The legislative history confirms this interpretation, explicitly stating that the bill has 'two mental state requirements.' This conclusion aligns with the general criminal law principle that ignorance of the law is not an excuse. The court distinguished this case from Liparota v. United States, which involved knowledge of an attendant legal circumstance (whether food stamp possession was authorized), not knowledge of the criminality of the act itself.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the mens rea requirements for federal trademark counterfeiting, affirming the traditional criminal law principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense. It clarifies that the statute's 'knowingly' element applies to the factual circumstance of the mark being counterfeit, not the legal status of the act. The ruling strengthens the enforcement of intellectual property laws through criminal sanctions by preventing defendants from using a claim of legal ignorance as a defense for conduct they knew was factually wrongful. This precedent makes it clear that for statutes criminalizing inherently deceptive commercial acts, prosecutors generally do not need to prove the defendant studied the specific criminal code section they violated.
