United States v. Bagley
473 U.S. 667 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence withheld by the prosecution is material, requiring reversal of a conviction, only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Facts:
- Hughes Anderson Bagley was the subject of an undercover federal investigation for narcotics and firearms violations conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).
- The government's two principal witnesses were James O'Connor and Donald Mitchell, private security guards who assisted the ATF investigation.
- Before trial, Bagley's counsel filed a discovery motion specifically requesting information about any 'deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony.'
- The government did not disclose any such agreements and provided affidavits from O'Connor and Mitchell in which they denied receiving any promises of reward.
- Unbeknownst to the defense, both O'Connor and Mitchell had signed contracts with the ATF to be paid for providing information.
- These contracts stipulated that the United States would pay each man a sum 'commensurate with services and information rendered' upon the 'accomplishment of the objective sought to be obtained.'
- After Bagley was convicted, O'Connor and Mitchell were each paid $300 by the ATF pursuant to these contracts.
Procedural Posture:
- Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted on federal charges in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington.
- Bagley filed a pre-trial discovery motion requesting information on any deals or inducements made to government witnesses.
- Following a bench trial, the District Court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges.
- Bagley later filed a motion in the same District Court to vacate his sentence, alleging the government's failure to disclose the witness contracts violated his due process rights under Brady.
- The District Court denied the motion, finding that the disclosure would not have affected the trial's outcome.
- Bagley (appellant) appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with the United States as appellee.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision, holding that the failure to disclose requested impeachment evidence required automatic reversal of the conviction.
- The United States (petitioner) was granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Is undisclosed impeachment evidence material under Brady v. Maryland, requiring reversal of a conviction, only if there is a reasonable probability that the disclosure would have changed the outcome of the trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Blackmun
Yes. Evidence is material under Brady only if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. This single standard of materiality applies to all cases of suppressed exculpatory or impeachment evidence, regardless of whether the defense made a specific, general, or no request for the information. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's rule of automatic reversal for nondisclosure of impeachment evidence, holding that such evidence is not constitutionally different from exculpatory evidence. The Court consolidated the tiered approach from United States v. Agurs into a single test, adopting the 'reasonable probability' standard from Strickland v. Washington, defined as a probability 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' A reviewing court applying this standard should consider any adverse effect the nondisclosure may have had on the preparation and presentation of the defense, especially when a specific request was made and the prosecutor's non-response misled counsel. The case is remanded for the lower court to apply this unified standard.
Concurring - Justice White
Yes. The proper standard for materiality is whether there is a 'reasonable probability' that disclosure of the withheld evidence would have led to a different result. This standard is sufficiently flexible to cover all Brady situations. It is unnecessary to elaborate further on how the specificity of a defense request for information should factor into the analysis, as the standard itself is adequate. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed for failing to apply this standard.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
No. When the government withholds evidence that could impeach its only key witnesses, the failure to disclose cannot be considered harmless error. The government's entire case against Bagley for the distribution counts relied on the testimony of O'Connor and Mitchell. The undisclosed contracts gave these witnesses a direct, personal stake in securing a conviction, which is powerful impeachment evidence that the trier of fact was entitled to hear. The majority's 'reasonable probability' test is inadequate because it encourages prosecutors to gamble on nondisclosure and places an unfair retrospective burden on the defendant. The proper approach would be to require prosecutors to disclose all favorable evidence, and if they fail to do so, the conviction should be reversed unless the government can prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman standard.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No. The Court is incorrectly rewriting the established Brady rule by collapsing the distinct standards from United States v. Agurs. The Agurs framework correctly distinguished between different situations. For cases like this one, involving the suppression of evidence in response to a specific request, the proper standard is whether there is 'any reasonable likelihood' the evidence 'could have affected' the outcome. The Court's new, unified 'reasonable probability' standard was developed for the no-request or general-request context and improperly weakens the prosecutor's duty when a specific request puts them on notice of the evidence's importance. A prosecutor's silence in the face of a specific request actively misleads the defense and should be treated with greater scrutiny.
Analysis:
United States v. Bagley is a landmark decision that unified the standard of materiality for all Brady claims. It eliminated the tiered framework from United States v. Agurs, which applied different standards depending on the specificity of the defense's request. By adopting the single 'reasonable probability' test from the ineffective assistance of counsel context (Strickland v. Washington), the Court created a consistent but more stringent standard for defendants to meet, particularly in cases where a specific request for evidence was made. This decision simplifies the materiality analysis for lower courts but has been criticized for potentially reducing prosecutorial incentives for disclosure and placing a heavier burden on defendants to prove prejudice after a conviction.
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