United States v. Awan
384 F. App'x 9 (2010)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it includes a scienter requirement that the defendant act "knowing or intending" their actions will further a specified crime, as this element provides sufficient notice of what conduct is proscribed.
Facts:
- Khalid Awan associated with Paramjit Singh Panjwar, the leader of the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), a group Awan knew sought the violent overthrow of a region from India.
- Awan received money from Gurbax Singh and Baljinder Singh with the explicit understanding that he would transfer it to Panjwar.
- Awan knew that the money he transferred to Panjwar and the KCF would be used for violent acts, including what he described as the "shooting and killing of innocent people."
- Awan offered to help another individual, Harjit Singh, travel to Pakistan to receive training in weapons and bomb-making for the KCF.
- After transferring funds, Awan would confirm their receipt with Panjwar and then monitor newspapers for reports of subsequent attacks.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government charged Khalid Awan in a superseding indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (a federal trial court).
- Awan filed pre-trial motions to suppress his custodial statements and evidence seized from his properties, which the district court denied.
- After a trial, a jury convicted Awan of conspiring to provide material support to terrorists, providing material support to terrorists, and money laundering.
- Awan, as the Defendant-Appellant, appealed his convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The United States, as the Appellee-Cross-Appellant, argued to uphold the convictions.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which prohibits providing material support or resources such as "personnel" to further certain crimes, unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant who conspired to recruit an individual for a foreign terrorist organization?
Opinions:
Majority - Pooler, Raggi, Livingston (per curiam)
No, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The statute’s scienter requirement mitigates any potential vagueness by ensuring that a defendant has notice that their conduct is prohibited. The court reasoned that the statute requires the defendant to provide material support "knowing or intending" that it will be used to carry out an enumerated crime. This intent element sufficiently clarifies the statute's prohibitions. The court rejected Awan's argument that the term "personnel" is vague, holding that in the context of the indictment, it plainly refers to persons engaged in preparing for or carrying out the underlying crime of murder abroad. Because Awan conspired to recruit Harjit Singh for training and attacks, Singh "comfortably falls within the meaning of 'personnel.'" As the statute was not vague as applied to Awan's specific conduct, his facial challenge to the statute's constitutionality also failed.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that a strong scienter requirement can cure potential constitutional vagueness in a criminal statute's definitions. By linking the meaning of undefined terms like "personnel" directly to the defendant's criminal intent, the court provides a framework for upholding material support statutes against vagueness challenges. The ruling solidifies the constitutionality of § 2339A, making it a more resilient tool for prosecutors in counterterrorism cases and signaling that defendants who clearly intend to aid criminal violence will have difficulty claiming they lacked notice their conduct was illegal.
