United States v. Artez Brewer
915 F.3d 408 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
A warrant's geographic limitation that does not reflect a probable-cause finding or a particularity requirement does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, which is unconcerned with state borders; also, evidence of unindicted robberies with a distinct modus operandi is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) to prove identity and intent if its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Facts:
- On April 28, 2016, a woman robbed Centier Bank in Griffith, Indiana, a day after a young man had made an unusual request for two-dollar bills there, with security footage showing a dark Chevrolet Impala fleeing.
- On April 29, 2016, a woman robbed State Bank & Trust in Perrysburg, Ohio, after a young man lingered in the bank and then loitered across the street in a black sedan.
- On May 6, 2016, a woman robbed MainSource Bank in Crown Point, Indiana, after a young man had requested two-dollar bills, fleeing in a beige Toyota sedan.
- On May 27, 2016, a woman robbed Horizon Bank in Whiting, Indiana, after a young man had requested one-dollar gold coins, fleeing in a Toyota Corolla.
- An FBI task force identified Artez Brewer as the young man present before the robberies and observed him living with Robin Pawlak in Gary, Indiana, and driving a silver Volvo, in addition to a Toyota.
- A state-court magistrate issued a warrant permitting GPS monitoring of Brewer's Volvo for 45 days "within the State of Indiana," based on an affidavit referencing multistate bank robberies, but the officer who later tracked the car was unaware of this in-state limitation.
- From June 7, 2016, the task force tracked Brewer's Volvo via GPS as it traveled from Indiana through Illinois to Los Angeles, California.
- On June 10, 2016, officers observed Brewer and Pawlak near Banner Bank in Los Angeles; Brewer circled the bank, and Pawlak subsequently robbed it using similar methods before they were arrested, and a bag of cash was found.
- After his arrest, Brewer made statements to agents implicating himself in the crime spree, and a search of his residence revealed car titles for an Impala and a Corolla, along with clothing matching what the pre-robbery man wore.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury returned an indictment against Artez Brewer, charging him with three counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), for three Indiana robberies.
- Brewer filed a motion to suppress evidence, partly concerning the GPS tracking of his Volvo outside of Indiana, which the district court (United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana) denied.
- Brewer proceeded to trial, where, over his objection, the government presented evidence of unindicted Ohio and California robberies under Rule 404(b).
- A jury convicted Brewer on all three counts.
- The district court sentenced Brewer to 137 months in prison, which included an additional 12 months beyond a previous 125-month sentence from the Central District of California for the L.A. robbery.
- Brewer appealed the district court's judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
1. Does the government violate the Fourth Amendment by tracking a vehicle with a GPS device beyond a warrant's in-state geographic limitation when that limitation does not reflect a probable-cause finding or a particularity requirement? 2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of unindicted robberies under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) to prove identity and intent?
Opinions:
Majority - St. Eve
1. No, the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment by tracking Brewer's vehicle with a GPS device beyond the warrant's in-state geographic limitation because the limitation did not reflect a probable-cause finding or a particularity requirement, and the Fourth Amendment is unconcerned with state borders. The court held that violating a search warrant is not always the same as violating the Fourth Amendment. While the Fourth Amendment requires warrants to particularly describe the places or things to be searched, it does not mandate that judges constrain officers with other "unenumerated" particularities, such as a geographic limitation not tied to probable cause. The Fourth Amendment's protections are also not heightened by state law; thus, a search complying with the Fourth Amendment remains valid even if it exceeds state-law or warrant limits not rooted in constitutional requirements. Citing United States v. Jones for the general requirement of a warrant for GPS tracking, the court distinguished between constitutional particularity requirements (like describing the vehicle) and mere warrant restrictions not based on probable cause. It noted that the affidavit supporting the warrant described a multistate robbery spree, making an Indiana-only limitation inconsistent with the underlying probable cause. Precedents like Richards v. Wisconsin (no-knock entry), United States v. Castetter (Fourth Amendment not concerned with state borders), and United States v. Simms (out-of-state GPS tracking not a Fourth Amendment violation if probable cause and particularity met) supported this distinction. The court concluded that Brewer received all he was entitled to under the Fourth Amendment: a warrant issued by an independent magistrate based on probable cause with a particular description of the thing to be searched (the Volvo). 2. No, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the unindicted Ohio and California robberies under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) because this evidence was relevant to prove Brewer's identity and intent through a distinctive modus operandi, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court applied the United States v. Gomez roadmap for Rule 404(b) evidence. It found that the government offered the other-act evidence for legitimate non-propensity purposes: identity through modus operandi and intent. The unique pattern of a man lingering before a robbery and a woman robbing the bank with specific tools (stick, note, black clothing) constituted a "distinctive" rather than identical method of operation. The similarities, despite minor differences (e.g., how the stick was placed), were sufficient to link Brewer to the Indiana robberies. The court also found the Rule 403 balancing proper because Brewer's defense put his identity (denying presence) and intent (claiming innocent purpose for being at banks) squarely at issue, making the other-act evidence highly probative. While prejudicial, it was not unfairly so given its relevance to the central issues of the case. The court noted that jury instructions properly limited the use of this evidence to motive, intent, knowledge, and modus operandi.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the scope of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement regarding geographic limitations, distinguishing between constitutionally mandated particularity (tied to probable cause) and ancillary warrant restrictions that do not heighten Fourth Amendment protections. It reaffirms that state-law or warrant provisions that do not reflect probable cause or particularity are not subject to Fourth Amendment remedies, particularly regarding interstate activities. Furthermore, the decision reinforces the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and the Gomez framework for admitting "other act" evidence, emphasizing that a "distinctive" rather than identical modus operandi is sufficient to prove identity and intent, especially when the defendant places these elements at issue. This offers flexibility to prosecutors in proving complex crime sprees while guiding courts on proper Rule 403 balancing.
