United States v. Apple, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
N/A (2015)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A vertically-related entity that organizes a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy among its suppliers or distributors has committed a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The nature of the restraint (horizontal price-fixing) determines the standard of review, not the vertical position of the organizer.


Facts:

  • In 2007, Amazon launched the Kindle e-reader and began selling popular ebooks, such as new releases and bestsellers, for a uniform price of $9.99, which was often below the wholesale price it paid to publishers.
  • The six largest U.S. trade book publishers (the "Publisher Defendants") viewed Amazon's pricing as a serious threat to their business model, fearing it devalued books and cannibalized their more profitable hardcover sales.
  • Executives from the Publisher Defendants communicated with each other about strategies to force Amazon to raise prices, including collectively withholding new books, a practice known as "windowing."
  • In late 2009, as Apple prepared to launch the iPad and its own "iBookstore," it saw an opportunity to enter the ebook market by aligning with the publishers' goal of raising prices.
  • Apple negotiated with the Publisher Defendants, proposing a shift from a "wholesale model" to an "agency model," where publishers would set the retail prices and Apple would receive a 30% commission.
  • Apple's proposed contracts included a Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clause, which contractually required that no other retailer could sell an ebook for a lower price than it was sold for in the iBookstore.
  • Apple assured publishers it would only launch if a "critical mass" of them signed on, kept them informed of each other's commitment status, and actively facilitated communications between them to create a united front against Amazon.
  • After five of the six major publishers signed these agency agreements with Apple, they collectively used their leverage to force Amazon to abandon its wholesale model, leading to an immediate and significant increase in the retail prices of their ebooks.

Procedural Posture:

  • The U.S. Department of Justice and 33 states and territories sued Apple and five major publishing companies in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
  • The complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to raise retail prices for ebooks in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
  • All five Publisher Defendants settled with the government and entered into consent decrees before trial.
  • Apple proceeded to a three-week bench trial on the issue of liability.
  • The district court found Apple liable, concluding that it had orchestrated a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy which constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act and, alternatively, an unreasonable restraint of trade under the rule of reason.
  • The district court entered a final judgment and issued an injunctive order against Apple.
  • Apple appealed the district court's liability finding and portions of the injunctive order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Locked

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Issue:

Does a company that facilitates a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy among its suppliers commit a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act?


Opinions:

Majority - Livingston, J.

Yes. A company that organizes a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy among its suppliers commits a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The agreement orchestrated by Apple was a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy among the Publisher Defendants, which is the archetypal example of a per se unlawful restraint of trade. The fact that Apple, the organizer, stands in a vertical relationship to the publishers does not change the horizontal nature of the illegal restraint it knowingly created. Supreme Court precedent in cases like Klor's and General Motors establishes that the vertical organizer of a horizontal cartel is liable for the per se illegal restraint. While Leegin holds that purely vertical price restraints are judged under the rule of reason, it explicitly distinguishes cases where vertical agreements are used to facilitate a horizontal cartel, which remain per se unlawful. Apple was not an unwitting facilitator but the conscious organizer who used the publishers' desire for higher prices as a lever to enter the market on its own terms, which included eliminating retail price competition.


Concurring - Lohier, J.

Yes. Apple's orchestration of a horizontal price-fixing agreement among the publishers is a clear per se violation of the Sherman Act. The central agreement at issue is the publishers' horizontal scheme to fix ebook prices, which is a classic per se violation. Apple's argument that it needed to combat Amazon's market dominance is unavailing; responding to a competitor's market power with a price-fixing conspiracy amounts to 'marketplace vigilantism,' which is not sanctioned by the Sherman Act. The court should affirm on the basis of the per se rule alone without needing to analyze the case under the rule of reason.


Dissenting - Jacobs, J.

No. A vertical agreement that facilitates a horizontal cartel should be judged under the rule of reason, not the per se rule. The Supreme Court's decision in Leegin dictates that vertical arrangements facilitating horizontal cartels must be analyzed under the rule of reason. Apple's conduct was purely vertical; it was a potential new entrant competing against the retailer Amazon, not a publisher colluding with other publishers. Under a proper rule of reason analysis, Apple's actions were overwhelmingly pro-competitive because they broke Amazon's 90% monopoly, dismantled a barrier to entry (Amazon's below-cost pricing), and deconcentrated the retail market. The resulting price increase was a natural and necessary consequence of ending a monopolist's unsustainable pricing strategy and restoring a competitive market structure.



Analysis:

This decision solidifies the application of the per se rule to 'hub-and-spoke' conspiracies, confirming that a powerful vertical actor (the hub) can be held liable for organizing a horizontal price-fixing agreement among its suppliers or distributors (the spokes). The ruling serves as a significant precedent for digital platform liability, establishing that a new entrant cannot justify organizing a cartel as a condition of entry, even if the market is dominated by a powerful incumbent. It signals that courts will focus on the nature of the anticompetitive restraint itself (horizontal price-fixing) rather than allowing the vertical position of an organizer to shield it from per se condemnation.

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