United States v. Antonio Santiago-Godinez
1993 WL 535201, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33814, 12 F.3d 722 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is not entitled to present an entrapment defense to a jury where their proffered evidence, taken as true, fails to show a lack of predisposition and demonstrates only that the government provided an ordinary opportunity to commit a crime for profit, even if the defendant was financially vulnerable.
Facts:
- Antonio Santiago-Godinez had known government informant Reuben Aleantar since approximately 1987.
- After his family's grocery store and his sister's bar closed, and he was laid off from a maintenance job, Santiago-Godinez was financially destitute by late November 1990.
- Beginning in August 1990, Aleantar, who owned a bar frequented by Santiago-Godinez, repeatedly asked him to procure large quantities of cocaine.
- Aleantar flaunted wealth he claimed was from drug-dealing and told Santiago-Godinez he could make similar money, offering to pay above-market prices for cocaine.
- Santiago-Godinez initially and repeatedly rejected Aleantar's offers over a period of several months.
- On November 30, 1990, while financially destitute, Santiago-Godinez finally agreed to the scheme after Aleantar again promised he could become wealthy quickly.
- After agreeing, Santiago-Godinez independently contacted an acquaintance and arranged to purchase two kilograms of cocaine.
- On December 3, 1990, Santiago-Godinez and an associate, Jesus Perez, met with an undercover DEA agent to sell the two kilograms of cocaine and were arrested.
Procedural Posture:
- Antonio Santiago-Godinez was charged in a two-count federal indictment for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
- The defendant filed a motion to compel the government to produce its informant to testify on the issue of entrapment.
- In response, the government filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence of entrapment from the trial.
- The U.S. District Court held a pretrial hearing and granted the government's motion, ruling that the defendant's proffered evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish an entrapment defense.
- Santiago-Godinez then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count, reserving his right to appeal the district court's pretrial ruling on the entrapment defense.
- Santiago-Godinez (appellant) appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with the United States as appellee.
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Issue:
Does a district court err in granting a pretrial motion to preclude a defendant from presenting an entrapment defense when the defendant's proffered evidence, even if accepted as true, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish the defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Kanne, Circuit Judge.
No, a district court does not err in precluding an entrapment defense before trial if the defendant's proffered evidence is legally insufficient to support it. The defense of entrapment requires both government inducement and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant. Predisposition is the central element, focusing on whether the defendant was an 'unwary innocent' or an 'unwary criminal' who readily availed himself of the opportunity. A predisposed person is one who takes advantage of an ordinary criminal opportunity, not an extraordinary one that might entice an otherwise law-abiding person. Here, Santiago-Godinez's evidence, even if true, did not show a lack of predisposition. The informant's persistence, appeals to friendship, and promises of wealth were not 'extraordinary inducements' but rather an 'ordinary opportunity' to profit from crime. The fact that Santiago-Godinez was able to procure cocaine from his own source, independent of the government, demonstrated he was poised to engage in drug trafficking. Because he merely accepted an ordinary criminal offer without extraordinary inducements, he demonstrated his predisposition, and the district court was correct to rule that he was not entitled to the defense as a matter of law.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the procedural handling and substantive threshold of the entrapment defense. It affirms that a trial court can decide the legal sufficiency of a proffered entrapment defense pre-trial, effectively gatekeeping the defense from the jury if the evidence is insufficient. Substantively, the case reinforces that financial desperation and persistent offers of ordinary criminal profits do not constitute the 'extraordinary inducement' necessary to entrap a non-predisposed individual. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants to reach a jury with an entrapment defense based solely on economic vulnerability, requiring them to show inducement that goes beyond a typical criminal opportunity.
