United States v. Anthony
Not applicable (2022)
Rule of Law:
Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) (18 U.S.C. § 1593), restitution may only be ordered for losses that are a direct and proximate result of the defendant's offense, requiring the government to prove 'but-for' causation, meaning the victim's losses would not have occurred without the defendant's specific conduct.
Facts:
- In May and June 2014, when R.W. was 14 years old, William Johnson prostituted her and subjected her to extreme physical and psychological abuse.
- In October 2014, R.W. fell under the control of Maurice Johnson, another pimp, who also abused and prostituted her for three weeks.
- On October 24, Curtis Anthony called an escort line operated by Tonya Gay Gum, one of Maurice Johnson’s accomplices, seeking 'company' at his office.
- Ms. Gum sent R.W. to Curtis Anthony’s office, but R.W. left after he could not locate cash to pay her.
- Shortly afterward, Curtis Anthony found his wallet, called the hotline again, and asked for R.W. to return, at which point M.M. joined R.W. at his office.
- Curtis Anthony paid R.W. and M.M. to strip naked, touched them, and then had sex with M.M. while R.W. waited outside.
- Three days after the encounter with Curtis Anthony, law enforcement officers rescued R.W. and M.M.
- During the three weeks under Maurice Johnson’s control, R.W. and M.M. generated approximately $40,000 for the prostitution ring.
Procedural Posture:
- Curtis Anthony was indicted and charged with child-sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit child-sex trafficking.
- A jury found Curtis Anthony guilty on both counts.
- The district court sentenced Curtis Anthony to 10 years of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $327,013.50 in restitution to R.W. and $308,233.50 to M.M.
- Curtis Anthony appealed the entire restitution award for R.W. (and part of the award to M.M.) to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (as appellant).
- The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Anthony, 942 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 2019) ('Anthony I'), vacated the district court’s restitution order as to R.W., holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1593 requires but-for causation and that the record did not satisfy this standard.
- The Tenth Circuit in Anthony I remanded the case to the district court with instructions to recalculate restitution based on actual losses directly resulting from Mr. Anthony's offenses.
- On remand, the Government again sought restitution from Curtis Anthony, submitting an expert report from Dr. C. David Missar recommending $1,143,000 in restitution for R.W.
- The district court denied the Government’s request for Mr. Anthony to pay $1,143,000 in restitution to R.W., finding that the expert report failed to determine which losses compensable by restitution she would not have suffered but for Mr. Anthony’s conduct.
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Issue:
Does the government satisfy its burden to prove but-for causation for a restitution award under 18 U.S.C. § 1593 when it presents expert testimony stating a victim would require the same lifetime of treatment and other compensation for a defendant's offense, even if prior traumas did not exist, without disaggregating the losses attributable solely to the defendant's conduct from harms caused by other abusers?
Opinions:
Majority - Matheson, Circuit Judge
No, the government does not satisfy its burden to prove but-for causation for a restitution award under 18 U.S.C. § 1593 when it presents expert testimony stating a victim would require the same lifetime of treatment and other compensation for a defendant's offense, even if prior traumas did not exist, without disaggregating the losses attributable solely to the defendant's conduct from harms caused by other abusers. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of restitution, holding that the government's expert report, prepared by Dr. Missar, failed to establish but-for causation as required by United States v. Anthony, 942 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 2019) ('Anthony I'). The court reiterated that restitution may only be ordered for losses 'actually resulting from the offense of conviction' and that the defendant's conduct must be a but-for cause of those losses. But-for causation means the specific outcome (the victim's losses) would not have happened 'but for' the defendant's actions, as established in Bostock v. Clayton Cty, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). The expert's opinion that R.W. 'would need identical treatment for Mr. Anthony’s offenses . . . even if she had sustained no prior traumas' merely showed that Mr. Anthony’s actions were sufficient to cause some losses, but it failed to disaggregate the harms he caused from the extensive harms caused by other abusers. This approach sidesteps the but-for causation standard, which requires identifying the treatment R.W. would need solely because of Mr. Anthony’s offenses. The court found that the government repeatedly relied on a rejected 'sufficient-causation' theory, failing to differentiate the harms as required by Anthony I. Consequently, without such proof, the district court correctly denied restitution for lifetime treatment costs, tutoring, and lost wages. The court also rejected the government's procedural challenges, noting that the government bears the burden of proof, did not request a hearing, and the district court did not exclude the expert report but rather found its substance lacking in proving but-for causation.
Analysis:
This case strongly reinforces the requirement for strict but-for causation in restitution awards under the TVPRA, particularly in scenarios involving multiple perpetrators and complex victim trauma. It clarifies that merely asserting a defendant's actions were sufficient to cause harm, or that a victim would require treatment irrespective of prior trauma, is insufficient to meet the but-for standard if the victim has suffered trauma from other sources. The ruling provides critical guidance for prosecutors, emphasizing the need for expert testimony and evidence to precisely disaggregate losses attributable solely to the defendant's specific offense. It implies that a failure to present such specific evidence, even in cases of severe and undeniable harm to a victim, will result in no restitution award, thereby placing a significant burden on the government in complex, multi-perpetrator cases.
