United States v. Anderson
772 F.3d 969, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22229, 2014 WL 6610019 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant may not suppress evidence on substantive due process grounds when that evidence was obtained through unconstitutional police conduct directed at a third party, as the Due Process Clause's limitations only apply when the government's activity violates a protected right of the defendant themselves.
Facts:
- Vermont state troopers conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Valentino Anderson, with his wife, Crystal Anderson, as a passenger.
- During the stop, troopers found drug paraphernalia in Crystal Anderson's handbag and suspected she was hiding drugs on her person.
- Valentino Anderson was released, but troopers detained Crystal Anderson and took her to the police barracks.
- Troopers applied for a warrant for a body cavity search of Crystal Anderson, but a state court judge denied the application.
- For approximately six hours, troopers concealed the denial from Crystal Anderson, falsely represented that the warrant was forthcoming, and threatened a forcible hospital search.
- Troopers also applied psychological pressure, telling Crystal Anderson that her husband had incriminated her and left her to take the blame.
- After being handcuffed to a chair for hours and subjected to coercive interrogation and misrepresentations, Crystal Anderson surrendered, removed a condom containing drugs from her vagina, and gave it to a female officer.
- The government then sought to use these drugs as evidence against Valentino Anderson in his criminal trial.
Procedural Posture:
- Valentino Anderson and his wife, Crystal Anderson, were indicted on federal drug possession and conspiracy charges.
- Crystal Anderson initially moved to suppress evidence but later withdrew the motion and pleaded guilty.
- Valentino Anderson filed a motion in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont to suppress the drugs, arguing their admission would violate his Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights because of the outrageous police conduct used to obtain them from his wife.
- The District Court granted Anderson's motion to suppress the evidence, concluding the police conduct shocked the conscience.
- The Government, as the appellant, appealed the District Court's suppression order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with Valentino Anderson as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause permit a defendant to suppress evidence obtained as a result of outrageous and unconstitutional police conduct directed solely at a third party?
Opinions:
Majority - Barrington D. Parker, Circuit Judge
No. A defendant cannot suppress evidence on substantive due process grounds when it was obtained as a consequence of an illegal search or outrageous conduct directed at a third party, rather than the defendant himself. The court's reasoning is grounded in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Payner, which holds that the protections of the Due Process Clause are personal and 'come into play only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the defendant.' Just as a defendant lacks standing to suppress evidence from a Fourth Amendment violation against a third party, they also lack standing to assert a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim for such conduct. Although the conduct of the Vermont state police toward Crystal Anderson was 'deceptive, coercive and illegal,' it did not violate any of Valentino Anderson's personal constitutional rights. The court also rejected the use of its 'supervisory power' to suppress the evidence, again citing Payner for the principle that this power does not authorize suppressing evidence unlawfully seized from a third party.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that constitutional protections against unlawful searches and seizures are personal rights that cannot be vicariously asserted. By extending the standing logic of the Fourth Amendment to a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim, the court significantly limits the 'shocks the conscience' doctrine as a basis for evidence suppression. The ruling establishes that even flagrantly illegal police conduct directed at a third party will not lead to suppression of evidence in another person's trial, thereby prioritizing the defendant's personal rights over the court's desire to deter police misconduct in general. This holding makes it more difficult for co-defendants or conspirators to benefit from constitutional violations committed against one another during an investigation.
