United States v. Alvin Ralph Mound
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27585, 157 F.3d 1153, 1998 WL 744231 (1998)
Rule of Law:
The denial of a rehearing en banc maintains the precedent that Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which permits the admission of evidence regarding a defendant's past sexual assaults in sexual misconduct cases, does not inherently violate the Due Process Clause despite concerns regarding the prejudicial nature of propensity evidence.
Facts:
- Congress proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 413 to govern the admissibility of evidence in sexual assault cases.
- The Judicial Conference of the United States appointed two committees, totaling 40 members, to review the proposed rule.
- These committees almost unanimously urged Congress to reject the rule, citing deep concerns about its fundamental fairness and departure from legal tradition.
- Despite these warnings, Congress passed Federal Rule of Evidence 413 into law.
- The rule permits prosecutors to introduce evidence of a defendant's past sexual behavior to show a propensity to commit the charged sexual offense.
- Research indicates that the predictive power of past sexual behavior is statistically low, with recidivism rates for rape being lower than for most major crimes except murder.
- The government sought to utilize this rule to introduce evidence of prior acts against a defendant in a criminal prosecution.
Procedural Posture:
- The government prosecuted the defendant in federal district court (trial court).
- The district court applied Federal Rule of Evidence 413 during the proceedings.
- Following a conviction (implied), the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- A panel of the Court of Appeals issued a decision affirming the lower court (implied).
- The defendant filed a suggestion for rehearing en banc (asking the full court to review the case).
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Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which allows the admission of propensity evidence regarding prior sexual acts in sexual assault cases, violate the Due Process Clause by creating an undue risk that a jury will convict a defendant based on past conduct or unsavory character rather than proof of the specific charged crime?
Opinions:
Dissenting - Morris Sheppard Arnold
Yes, the court should have granted a rehearing to determine if the rule is unconstitutional, as it arguably violates fundamental conceptions of justice. Judge Arnold argues that Federal Rule of Evidence 413 contradicts a 'centuries-old legal tradition' that views propensity evidence with extreme skepticism. He emphasizes that the rule may displace essential protections that are fundamental to American jurisprudence. The dissent questions the rationality of the rule, noting that the 'prognosticative power of past sexual behavior is quite low' and citing statistics that rape recidivism is lower than that of other major crimes. Consequently, the dissent believes the court needs to evaluate whether the rule presents such a high risk of a jury convicting based on 'unsavory character' that it violates the Due Process Clause.
Analysis:
This dissent highlights a significant tension between legislative authority and judicial oversight regarding the rules of evidence. While Congress has the power to enact rules like FRE 413, the dissent argues that the Judiciary retains the obligation to review those rules for rationality and fairness under the Due Process Clause. The opinion underscores the danger of 'propensity evidence'—convicting someone because they are a 'bad person' rather than because they are proven guilty of the specific crime charged. This dissent serves as a significant critique of the shift away from common law protections against character evidence in sexual assault cases.
