United States v. Allen
341 F.3d 870 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
A municipal park qualifies as a 'place of public accommodation' under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a if its operations affect interstate commerce. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), which criminalizes racially motivated interference with the use of state-administered facilities, is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under both the Commerce Clause and the Thirteenth Amendment.
Facts:
- In the spring of 2000, Sean Allen, Eric Dixon, and Jeremiah Skidmore founded the Montana Front Working Class Skinheads (MFWCS), a white supremacist, neo-Nazi organization in Billings, Montana.
- The purpose of the MFWCS was to eliminate racial minorities and Jews, using violence if necessary.
- Members of the MFWCS were encouraged to earn status symbols, such as red suspenders, by physically assaulting racial minorities and Jews.
- On July 29, 2000, members and affiliates of the MFWCS attended a barbecue at Allen's house, where they discussed conducting a 'park patrol' to 'clean out all the minorities' from a local park.
- That evening, a group of nine MFWCS affiliates, including Michael Flom, Jason Potter, and Ryan Flaherty, went to Pioneer Park armed with weapons such as axe handles, flat bars, and chains.
- At the park, the group surrounded Spring Ramirez (Hispanic), Jason Clark (African American), and Pat Tellez (Hispanic), who were socializing at a table.
- The attackers berated the three individuals with racial epithets, threatened them with weapons, and chased them out of the park.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana indicted Sean Allen, Eric Dixon, Jeremiah Skidmore, Jason Potter, Ryan Flaherty, and Michael Flom.
- The indictment charged the defendants with violating 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy against rights) and 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (interference with federally protected activities).
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Allen, Dixon, Potter, Flaherty, and Flom on all counts.
- The jury convicted Skidmore on the conspiracy count under § 241 only.
- The district court entered judgments of conviction and sentenced all defendants to prison terms.
- The convicted defendants (appellants) appealed their convictions and sentences to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Is 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), which criminalizes racially motivated interference with a person's use of a state-administered facility like a public park, a constitutional exercise of Congress's legislative power under the Commerce Clause and the Thirteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Paez, Circuit Judge
Yes, 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) is a constitutional exercise of Congress's legislative power. The court also held that Pioneer Park qualifies as a 'place of public accommodation.' Regarding the first issue, the park is a public accommodation because its operations affect interstate commerce. This is evidenced by its purchase of equipment from other states, its use by out-of-state visitors, and its hosting of events for national organizations with out-of-state participants. Citing Daniel v. Paul, the court adopted a broad interpretation of 'place of entertainment' to include recreational areas. Regarding the second issue, the statute is constitutional on two independent grounds. First, under the Commerce Clause, it regulates racially motivated violence that interferes with federal civil rights, which Congress found has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, similar to the reasoning that upheld Title II of the Civil Rights Act in Heart of Atlanta Motel. Second, under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to eliminate the 'badges and incidents of slavery,' and it could rationally determine that racially motivated violence preventing minorities from using public facilities is such a badge or incident.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the federal government's authority to prosecute local, private hate crimes under federal civil rights statutes, even after Supreme Court decisions like Lopez and Morrison narrowed the scope of the Commerce Clause. By upholding § 245(b)(2)(B) on the dual constitutional grounds of the Commerce Clause and the Thirteenth Amendment, the court provides a robust legal foundation for federal intervention in racially motivated violence. The case also affirms a broad interpretation of what constitutes a 'place of public accommodation,' ensuring that civil rights protections extend to public recreational spaces with even minimal connections to interstate commerce, thereby expanding the reach of federal law in protecting against discrimination.
