United States v. Alexander
2009 WL 2151312, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 16084, 573 F.3d 465 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant abandons any reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle by explicitly disclaiming ownership to police, thereby losing standing to challenge its search. Additionally, a warrantless search is permissible when police obtain consent from a third party, like a repossession agent in lawful control of a vehicle, who has apparent authority to consent.
Facts:
- An anonymous caller informed apartment manager Kathy Bastían that Lazzerick Alexander was selling crack cocaine from Vaniece Harris's apartment and kept a gun hidden under the hood of his white Buick Riviera.
- Bastían relayed this detailed information to the Madison Police Department.
- Police officers, aware of an outstanding parole violation warrant for Alexander, learned that a repossession agent, Bryan Bowman, was planning to repossess the same white Buick Riviera.
- Officers conducted a traffic stop on the Buick, in which Alexander was a passenger, and arrested him on the warrant.
- During the arrest, Alexander repeatedly and explicitly stated to police that the Buick was not his car and belonged to the driver, Antwan Richmond.
- Bowman arrived, confirmed the vehicle's VIN, took possession of it, and then gave police consent to search the car.
- Police searched under the car's hood and discovered a bag containing a handgun.
- Officers then went to Vaniece Harris's apartment, where a drug dog alerted at the door. Officers entered to secure the premises while a warrant was being sought, and Harris eventually signed a form consenting to a search, which revealed another handgun and ammunition.
Procedural Posture:
- Lazzerick M. Alexander was charged in federal district court with possession of firearms by a convicted felon.
- Alexander filed a motion to suppress the handguns found during the vehicle and apartment searches as violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.
- After a hearing, a magistrate judge recommended that the motion to suppress be denied.
- The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and denied the motion.
- Alexander entered a conditional guilty plea, which reserved his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion.
- The district court entered a judgment of conviction, from which Alexander appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment require the suppression of evidence obtained from a warrantless vehicle search where the defendant disclaimed ownership and a repossession agent consented to the search, and from a subsequent apartment search where police secured the premises while seeking a warrant and eventually obtained consent from a co-habitant?
Opinions:
Majority - Tinder, Circuit Judge
No. The Fourth Amendment does not require suppression of the evidence from either the vehicle or the apartment search. For the vehicle search, Alexander abandoned his Fourth Amendment privacy interest. The test for abandonment is objective; by repeatedly disclaiming ownership of the Buick to officers before the search, a reasonable person in the officers' position would believe he had relinquished his property interests. Therefore, he lacks standing to challenge the search. Separately, the search was valid based on the apparent authority of the repossession agent, Bryan Bowman. The facts available to the officers—that Bowman was a repossessor, confirmed the VIN, and took possession—made it reasonable to believe he had authority to consent. Once the bag was found where the informant said a gun would be, police had probable cause to open it under the automobile exception. For the apartment search, the police entry to secure the premises was lawful because they had probable cause (from the corroborated tip and dog alert) to believe evidence was inside and needed to prevent its destruction while obtaining a warrant. Even if the entry were improper, the evidence is admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine, as officers had already begun the process of obtaining a warrant that would have certainly been issued. Finally, Harris's subsequent consent was determined to be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and was not tainted by the police entry.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the objective nature of the Fourth Amendment abandonment doctrine, establishing that a suspect's explicit disclaimers of ownership can extinguish their privacy rights and standing to challenge a search, irrespective of their subjective intent. It also provides a strong example of the apparent authority doctrine in a non-traditional context, affirming that police can reasonably rely on consent from a third party, such as a repossession agent, who appears to have lawful control over the property. Furthermore, the case illustrates the robustness of the inevitable discovery doctrine as a tool to prevent suppression where police have probable cause and have initiated steps to obtain a warrant, even if a subsequent entry or consent has potential legal flaws.
