United States v. Albertini
472 U.S. 675, 86 L. Ed. 2d 536, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 100 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
A person who has received a valid order barring them from a military installation may be convicted for reentering under 18 U.S.C. § 1382, even if the reentry occurs during an event open to the general public. The First Amendment does not protect such a reentry, as the government's significant interest in military security provides a reasonable basis for excluding individuals previously deemed a threat.
Facts:
- In 1972, James Vincent Albertini and a companion entered Hickam Air Force Base and destroyed secret Air Force documents by pouring animal blood on them.
- Following this incident, the Commander of Hickam issued Albertini a "bar letter," officially forbidding him from reentering the base without written permission.
- Nine years later, on May 16, 1981, Hickam Air Force Base hosted its annual Armed Forces Day open house, issuing press releases and radio announcements inviting the public to attend.
- Albertini entered the base during the open house with four friends to engage in a peaceful demonstration criticizing the nuclear arms race.
- While his companions unfurled a banner and distributed leaflets, Albertini took photographs of the displays.
- The Base Commander recognized Albertini as an individual who had been barred from the installation.
- Albertini and his companions were then apprehended by military police and escorted off the base.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States charged Albertini by information in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1382.
- After a bench trial, the District Court (trial court) convicted Albertini and sentenced him to three months' imprisonment.
- Albertini (as appellant) appealed the conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Hickam Air Force Base had become a temporary public forum and the military could not exclude Albertini.
- The United States (as petitioner) filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment prohibit the conviction of an individual under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 for reentering a military base from which he was previously barred, when the reentry occurs during a public open house for the purpose of peaceful demonstration?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O’Connor
No, the First Amendment does not prohibit the conviction. A valid bar order issued on reasonable grounds remains in effect even when a military installation is temporarily open to the public, and enforcing this exclusion does not violate the First Amendment. The court's reasoning began with a statutory analysis, concluding that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1382 applies to Albertini's conduct, as the statute contains no time limit on bar orders and applies regardless of whether the base is open or closed. The court then addressed the First Amendment claim, distinguishing this case from Flower v. United States, which involved a street that had been effectively ceded to the public. Hickam, even during an open house, is not a traditional public forum. The bar letter provided a reasonable, content-neutral basis for excluding Albertini that was distinct from the general public, based on his past unlawful conduct. The government's interest in protecting the security of its military installations is significant and outweighs the incidental burden on Albertini's speech, satisfying the O'Brien test. The military is not required to wait for a previously barred individual to cause further disruption before enforcing a valid exclusion order.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes, the First Amendment should prohibit the conviction. Congress did not intend for § 1382 to criminalize a reentry when circumstances, such as a widely advertised public open house, reasonably indicate the visit is welcome. The dissent argued that a starkly literal interpretation of the statute leads to absurd results and that its purpose was to punish defiant trespassers like spies and panderers, not individuals responding to a public invitation nine years after a minor offense. The passage of nearly a decade significantly attenuated the evidentiary significance of the bar letter, and a reasonable person would not believe its prohibition continued in perpetuity to override a specific invitation to the public. The dissent distinguishes between the military commander's broad power to exclude someone and the much narrower power of the sovereign to criminally punish them under this specific statute. Albertini's entry was not the kind of defiant reentry Congress sought to prohibit.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that military installations are not public forums, even when they invite the public for events like open houses. It establishes that a prior, valid bar order based on past misconduct creates a distinct legal status for an individual, revoking any First Amendment right of entry that might otherwise be afforded to the general public. The ruling significantly strengthens the government's authority to control access to its facilities for security purposes, prioritizing that interest over the expressive rights of specific individuals deemed a threat. The case clarifies that content-neutral security regulations, like enforcing bar orders, need not be the least restrictive means possible to survive First Amendment scrutiny under the O'Brien framework.
