United States v. Albert Reginald Walker
835 F.2d 983, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 17674 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
Under 18 U.S.C. § 111, the element of "forcible" assault or intimidation does not require actual physical contact but is satisfied by a threat of immediate bodily harm that would cause a reasonable person to be in fear. The standard for determining if the threat is sufficient is objective, not based on the victim's subjective state of mind.
Facts:
- Albert Reginald Walker was on a five-year term of probation for a prior federal felony conviction.
- His probation officer, Donald Freeman, reported to the court that Walker had violated his probation by using drugs and failing to report for appointments.
- On October 15, 1986, a judge sentenced Walker to an 18-month prison term based on Freeman's report.
- Immediately after the sentencing, Walker went to the Probation Office and entered Freeman's office unannounced and without authorization.
- Walker stood over Freeman, who was seated, used abusive language, and threatened, "I am going to get you outside after work. You are going to pay for what you did," while making a gesture symbolizing a gun.
- When Freeman left his office, Walker followed him into a corridor, continued his harangue, stood about a foot away, and began to remove his jacket.
- Another probation officer, Bernard Ray, felt compelled to step between the two men because Walker was extremely irate and standing inches from Freeman.
Procedural Posture:
- Albert Reginald Walker was tried before a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (a federal trial court).
- The jury found Walker guilty of one count of forcibly assaulting, intimidating, and interfering with a federal probation officer.
- The district court entered a final judgment of conviction and sentenced Walker to five years' probation.
- Walker (appellant) appealed the conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. The government was the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's conduct, including verbal threats, aggressive gestures, and physically advancing on a federal officer, constitute 'forcible' assault or intimidation under 18 U.S.C. § 111 if it would cause a reasonable person to fear immediate bodily harm, even without explicit testimony from the officer about their subjective fear?
Opinions:
Majority - Kearse, Circuit Judge
Yes. The defendant's conduct constitutes forcible assault because the statute's 'forcibly' element is met by threats or physical aggression that would reasonably inspire fear of immediate bodily harm in a reasonable person, regardless of the victim's expressed subjective fear. The court reasoned that the standard under § 111 is objective. The purpose of the statute is to protect federal officials from acts or threats that might deter them from performing their duties. The court found that Walker's actions—entering unannounced, standing over Freeman, making a gun gesture, following him closely while repeating threats, and beginning to remove his jacket—were sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that a reasonable person in Freeman's position would have feared immediate physical violence. Therefore, explicit testimony from Freeman stating he was afraid was not a necessary element of the government's case.
Concurring - Lumbard, Circuit Judge
Yes. The author concurs in affirming the conviction. He states that the evidence was adequate for the jury to conclude that Walker's actions violated 18 U.S.C. § 111. Furthermore, he believed the prosecutor's rebuttal summation was a proper response to the defense's arguments and that the trial judge's instructions correctly clarified that the burden of proof remained solely with the government.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies that the standard for 'forcible' assault on a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111 is an objective 'reasonable person' test. It clarifies that the prosecution does not need to prove the officer was subjectively afraid, only that the defendant's actions would have made a reasonable person in the officer's position fearful of immediate harm. This lowers the evidentiary burden for the government in such cases, as it can rely on circumstantial evidence of threatening behavior rather than requiring direct testimony about the victim's state of mind. The ruling protects the law enforcement function itself by prohibiting intimidating conduct that could reasonably deter an official from performing their duties.
