United States v. Aguilar
515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
Providing false statements to an investigating agent not acting as an arm of the grand jury does not have the "natural and probable effect" of obstructing justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Additionally, disclosing information about a wiretap authorization with the intent to obstruct an interception violates 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c), regardless of whether the authorization has already expired.
Facts:
- Michael Tham, a convicted Teamsters official, filed a motion for postconviction relief, which was assigned to Judge Stanley Weigel.
- Tham's associate, Abraham 'Abe' Chapman, asked his acquaintance, U.S. District Judge Robert Aguilar, to speak with Judge Weigel about Tham's case, which Aguilar did.
- Separately, the FBI obtained a 30-day wiretap authorization for a racketeering investigation targeting Tham, which listed Chapman as a potential interceptee.
- This initial wiretap authorization expired by law on May 20, 1987, though its existence was kept secret.
- In August 1987, Chief Judge Robert Peckham informed Judge Aguilar that Chapman's name had appeared on a wiretap authorization.
- Five months later, Aguilar, believing Chapman's phone was still tapped under the initial authorization, told his nephew to warn Chapman that his phone was being wiretapped.
- Later, a grand jury began investigating an alleged conspiracy to influence Tham's habeas case.
- During that investigation, two FBI agents questioned Aguilar, who lied about his role in Tham's case and his knowledge of the wiretap.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted Judge Aguilar on one count of disclosing a wiretap (18 U.S.C. § 2232(c)) and one count of endeavoring to obstruct justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503).
- Following a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (the court of first instance), Aguilar was convicted on both counts.
- Aguilar (the appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the intermediate appellate court).
- A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the wiretap disclosure conviction but reversed the obstruction of justice conviction.
- The Ninth Circuit then reheard the case en banc and reversed both convictions.
- The United States (the petitioner) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
1. Does providing false statements to federal investigating agents, who are not acting as an arm of the grand jury, constitute an endeavor to "corruptly... influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice" under 18 U.S.C. § 1503? 2. Does 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c), which prohibits giving notice of a wiretap authorization to obstruct an interception, apply when the disclosure is made after the specific wiretap authorization has expired?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
As to Issue 1: No. Merely uttering false statements to an investigating agent who might or might not testify before a grand jury is insufficient to violate the omnibus clause of § 1503. The Court adopts a 'nexus' requirement, reasoning that the accused's action must have the 'natural and probable effect' of interfering with the due administration of justice. Unlike providing false documents or testimony directly to a grand jury, giving false statements to an investigating agent whose connection to the grand jury is speculative does not meet this standard. The government failed to show that the agents were acting as an 'arm of the grand jury,' so Aguilar's lies lacked the required nexus to a judicial proceeding. As to Issue 2: Yes. The plain language of § 2232(c) does not require that the wiretap authorization be pending or unexpired at the time of disclosure. The statute's elements are: 1) knowledge of an authorization or application, 2) disclosure made with the intent to obstruct 'such interception,' and 3) giving notice of the 'possible interception.' The phrase 'possible interception' does not mean interception must be factually possible at the moment of disclosure; rather, it acknowledges that at the time of disclosure, it may be unknown if an interception will occur. The crime is complete when the notice is given with the requisite intent, and factual impossibility is not a defense.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Stevens
As to Issue 1: Concurs with the majority. As to Issue 2: No. The Court of Appeals correctly held that § 2232(c) does not apply to disclosing an expired wiretap authorization. The statute prohibits interfering with a 'possible interception,' which implies that an interception must actually be possible. Once an authorization has expired, no 'such interception' can occur, making the attempt to obstruct it an attempt to do the impossible. The term 'possible' must place a temporal limit on liability, preventing absurd results like prosecuting someone for disclosing a 10-year-old wiretap.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Scalia
As to Issue 1: No. The majority's 'nexus' requirement improperly reads the word 'endeavor' out of § 1503. The statute criminalizes 'any effort or essay' to obstruct justice, regardless of its probability of success. The correct inquiry is not whether the act had a 'natural and probable effect,' but whether the defendant acted with the specific intent to obstruct justice. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Aguilar lied to the FBI agents with the specific intent of misleading the grand jury, which is sufficient to constitute a corrupt endeavor. As to Issue 2: Concurs with the majority.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of the omnibus clause of the federal obstruction of justice statute, § 1503. By establishing a 'nexus' requirement, the Court makes it more difficult for prosecutors to charge individuals for making false statements during preliminary investigations, requiring a clearer link between the conduct and an actual judicial proceeding. The ruling resolves a circuit split on the issue, setting a higher bar for obstruction charges based on lying to investigators. Conversely, the Court's interpretation of § 2232(c) broadly construes the wiretap disclosure law, confirming that factual impossibility is not a defense and focusing the crime on the defendant's intent to obstruct at the moment of disclosure.
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