United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc.
1974 Fla. LEXIS 4523, 303 So.2d 9 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
A non-profit corporation lacks standing to sue on behalf of the general public to protect alleged public rights in privately-owned land unless it demonstrates a special injury to itself or its members, differing in kind from that suffered by the public at large.
Facts:
- United States Steel Corporation (USS) owned Sand Key, a gulf-front island in Pinellas County, Florida.
- Save Sand Key, Inc. (SSK) was organized as a non-profit Florida corporation with the specific purpose of securing public use of as much as possible of Sand Key.
- USS commenced construction of rental and high-rise condominium apartment buildings on Sand Key as part of its development plan.
- USS fenced portions of Sand Key around its construction sites.
- SSK alleged that these fences effectively and substantially prohibited and interfered with the public's rights to the full use and enjoyment of the soft sand beach area of Sand Key.
- SSK alleged that the public had acquired rights to use portions of USS's land by prescription, implied dedication, and/or general and local custom.
Procedural Posture:
- Save Sand Key, Inc. and the Attorney General of Florida filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against United States Steel Corporation in a Florida trial court.
- United States Steel Corporation moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing Save Sand Key, Inc. lacked standing.
- The trial court granted United States Steel Corporation's motion, dismissing the complaint as to Save Sand Key, Inc., based on Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns.
- The Attorney General of Florida took a voluntary non-suit after the trial court's ruling.
- Save Sand Key, Inc. appealed the trial court's dismissal to the District Court of Appeal, Second District (appellant: Save Sand Key, Inc.; appellee: United States Steel Corporation).
- The District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order of dismissal, holding that the "special injury" concept was no longer valid and that a non-profit organization could sue on behalf of its aggrieved members, even if the rights were shared with the public. The District Court also expressly receded from its own prior conflicting decision in Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead — Save Our Bays.
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Issue:
Does a non-profit corporation, organized to secure public use of private land, have standing to sue to protect alleged public rights (e.g., prescriptive easements or implied dedication) without alleging a special injury differing in kind from that suffered by the general public?
Opinions:
Majority - Roberts, Justice
No, a non-profit corporation does not have standing to sue on behalf of the general public to protect alleged public rights in privately-owned land without alleging a special injury different in kind from that suffered by the general public. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed its prior decision in Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Kirk, which adopted the reasoning from Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns. This precedent established that plaintiffs, including organizations acting on behalf of members, must show a special injury distinct from that of the general public to maintain such an action. The Court rejected the District Court of Appeal's attempt to recede from this established Supreme Court precedent and its conclusion that the "special injury" concept was no longer viable, stating that it is not the province of District Courts to overrule Supreme Court decisions. The Court clarified that its narrow exception to the special injury rule in Department of Administration v. Horne, concerning constitutional challenges to taxing and spending power, was not applicable to the present case and affirmed that the special injury rule still generally applies.
Dissenting - Ervin, Justice
No, but a non-profit corporation should have standing to sue to protect the general public's rights to use and enjoy public property, even without a special injury different in kind from that suffered by the general public. Justice Ervin argued that the majority decision is contrary to citizens' First Amendment rights to organize corporately to protect public rights, particularly under the inalienable trust doctrine concerning navigable waters, tidelands, and sovereignty areas. He asserted that when public officials fail to protect these rights, aggrieved citizens or organizations should have standing. Referencing Department of Administration v. Horne, he contended that if taxpayers have standing to protect public monies, then environmental organizations should have standing to protect public tidelands and recreational areas. He agreed with the Second District's holding that a non-profit organization may sue on behalf of its directly and personally aggrieved members. Justice Ervin also reiterated his view that District Courts are not absolutely bound to slavishly follow Supreme Court decisions in areas of their final appellate jurisdiction, particularly when modern authority suggests otherwise, and that the Supreme Court's quashal power in certiorari only applies to the particular case.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the "special injury" rule for standing in Florida, particularly for organizations seeking to protect public rights in privately owned land. By reversing the District Court, the Florida Supreme Court reasserted its authority as the state's highest court, clarifying that intermediate appellate courts cannot recede from Supreme Court precedents. The decision highlights the judiciary's gatekeeping function, restricting who can bring lawsuits affecting broad public interests unless a direct and distinct harm is shown. It also underscores the narrowness of exceptions to traditional standing requirements, confining them to specific circumstances like constitutional challenges to taxing and spending, and emphasizes that mere ideological alignment with a public interest is insufficient for standing.
