UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fred SMITH, Defendant-Appellant
122 F.3d 1355, 47 Fed. R. Serv. 975, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26903 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A district court does not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, as such testimony may not assist the trier of fact, and the issues it addresses can be adequately handled through cross-examination and jury instructions.
Facts:
- On January 5, 1993, a person using a driver's license with the name 'Victor Eugene Smith' purchased a steel-colored, 9 millimeter semi-automatic handgun.
- On January 7, 1993, Fred Smith purchased an orange 1984 Mercury Capri and titled it in the name of 'Victor Smith.'
- On January 11, 1993, a lone individual robbed the Merchant Bank of Atlanta at gunpoint and was seen driving away in a reddish-orange car resembling a Mustang.
- The same day, the 'Victor Eugene Smith' driver's license was used to rent a room at the Relax Inn, and the motel clerk later identified Fred Smith as the individual who rented the room.
- Three hours after the Merchant Bank robbery, Terry Walker robbed a SouthTrust Bank using 'bait' bills whose serial numbers were traced back to the Merchant Bank robbery.
- The day after the robbery, Robert Lun, an inmate, saw surveillance photos on television and identified Fred Smith as the perpetrator.
- Smith was arrested on January 15, 1993, at which time he identified himself as Victor Eugene Smith and carried a false driver's license in that name.
- Five weeks after the Merchant Bank robbery, two of the three eyewitnesses identified Smith from a photographic array, while the third witness, teller Diane Hansek, selected another person's photograph.
Procedural Posture:
- Fred Smith was tried in a U.S. District Court (trial court) on a two-count indictment for bank robbery and use of a firearm.
- Prior to trial, the government sought to introduce evidence of other bank robberies; the district court excluded most of this evidence but allowed evidence related to the SouthTrust robbery, ruling it was 'inextricably intertwined.'
- The defense made an offer of proof for Dr. Brian Cutler to testify as an expert on the unreliability of eyewitness identification, but the district court excluded the testimony in its entirety.
- A jury convicted Smith on both counts.
- The court sentenced Smith to 336 months' imprisonment.
- Smith (appellant) appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, challenging the evidentiary rulings.
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Issue:
Does a district court abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony regarding the general reliability of eyewitness identification on the grounds that it does not assist the trier of fact and its probative value is outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No, a district court does not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification. The court held that its prior precedent in United States v. Thevis, which permits the exclusion of such testimony, remains valid even after the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court reasoned that Daubert's requirement that expert testimony must 'assist the trier of fact' is consistent with Thevis's conclusion that issues of eyewitness perception and memory can be adequately addressed through cross-examination and the jury's common-sense evaluation. Therefore, since the testimony is not considered necessary to assist the jury, a district court is within its discretion to exclude it. The court also affirmed the admission of evidence from a second robbery committed by Terry Walker, finding it was 'inextricably intertwined' with Smith's charged offense due to links like shared bait money, a similar weapon, and connections to the same motel room.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit's long-standing skepticism toward expert testimony on eyewitness identification, establishing that the more liberal standard for expert evidence set by Daubert does not automatically require its admission. The case solidifies that trial courts retain significant discretion to exclude such testimony, viewing it as potentially unhelpful and within the jury's common-sense ability to evaluate. This precedent forces defense attorneys in this circuit to rely on traditional methods like cross-examination and specific jury instructions to challenge the reliability of eyewitnesses, rather than presenting psychological research through an expert.
