United States Ex Rel. Volpe v. Smith
1933 U.S. LEXIS 188, 289 US 422, 53 S. Ct. 665 (1933)
Rule of Law:
An alien's return to the United States from a foreign country constitutes a new 'entry' under the Immigration Act of 1917, subjecting the alien to deportation for prior crimes involving moral turpitude, regardless of their previous lawful residence in the United States.
Facts:
- Volpe entered the United States from Italy in 1906 at age sixteen and resided continuously in the country without becoming a citizen.
- In 1925, Volpe pleaded guilty to counterfeiting U.S. obligations, a crime involving moral turpitude, and was imprisoned.
- In June 1928, Volpe traveled to Cuba for a brief visit without a passport.
- Volpe returned to the United States by airplane, landing at Key West, Florida, and was admitted by an immigration inspector.
Procedural Posture:
- The Secretary of Labor issued a warrant for Volpe's deportation.
- Volpe was taken into custody and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court at Chicago.
- The District Court dismissed the petition and remanded Volpe to the custody of the Immigration Director.
- Volpe appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
- The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment.
- Volpe petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the term 'entry' in the Immigration Act of 1917 encompass the return of a resident alien from a brief visit to a foreign country, thereby subjecting them to deportation based on a crime committed in the United States prior to that return?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice McReynolds
Yes, the statutory term 'entry' includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States, whether it is the first or a subsequent arrival. The Court reasoned that Congress holds plenary power to prescribe terms for alien admission and clearly intended the word 'entry' to hold its ordinary meaning. Citing precedents like Claussen v. Day, the Court held that a return from a foreign port is a distinct entry. The Court noted that aliens who commit crimes while residing in the U.S. may be considered more objectionable than those who violated laws abroad. Therefore, although Volpe might not have been deportable had he remained in the U.S. due to the statute of limitations on his 1925 conviction, his voluntary departure and subsequent return triggered a new 'entry,' subjecting him to exclusion based on his criminal record.
Analysis:
This decision firmly established the 're-entry doctrine' in U.S. immigration law, which posits that every return to the U.S. by an alien is legally equivalent to an initial entry. This interpretation has significant consequences for Lawful Permanent Residents (green card holders), as leaving the country—even for a short vacation—can expose them to inadmissibility grounds based on past conduct that would not otherwise trigger deportation if they stayed within U.S. borders. The ruling emphasizes the precarious nature of resident alien status compared to citizenship and underscores the broad authority of Congress to regulate borders.
