United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Keith
1998 Tex. LEXIS 85, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 928, 970 S.W.2d 540 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
To recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander, a plaintiff must be present when the injury-producing event occurs and have a sensory and contemporaneous perception of the accident. Arriving at the scene after the accident, even moments later during the immediate aftermath and rescue, does not satisfy this requirement.
Facts:
- Lyndsay Keith was a passenger in a car that swerved out of control and hit a tree approximately one block from her home.
- At the time of the crash, her mother, Dianna Keith, was asleep inside the residence.
- Shortly after the accident, a friend of Lyndsay's awoke Dianna Keith and rushed her to the scene.
- Upon arriving, Dianna Keith saw the wrecked car still smoking and heard her daughter inside making noises and crying out.
- Dianna Keith then witnessed her daughter being removed from the car and accompanied her in an ambulance.
- Lyndsay Keith later died from her injuries at the hospital.
- The owner of the vehicle in which Lyndsay was a passenger was uninsured or underinsured.
Procedural Posture:
- Dianna Keith presented a claim to her insurer, United States Automobile Association (USAA), for bystander recovery under her uninsured/underinsured motorist policy.
- USAA denied Keith’s bystander claim.
- Keith sued USAA in a Texas trial court on a bystander theory of recovery.
- Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dianna Keith.
- USAA, as appellant, appealed to the Texas court of appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case, holding that a material fact issue existed.
- Both Keith and USAA filed petitions for review with the Supreme Court of Texas, the state's highest court for civil matters.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff satisfy the 'sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident' requirement for bystander recovery when she is awakened after a car accident, arrives at the scene shortly thereafter while the wreckage is still smoking, and hears her injured child inside the vehicle?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A plaintiff does not satisfy the 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' requirement for bystander recovery by arriving at the scene shortly after the accident. The court reasoned that Texas law, as established in precedents like Freeman v. City of Pasadena, requires the bystander's presence when the injury occurred and a contemporaneous perception of the accident itself. The court found that because Dianna Keith was not at the scene when the accident occurred and did not see or hear the crash, her emotional impact resulted from observing the aftermath, not the event. The fact that she arrived during ongoing rescue operations and witnessed her daughter's suffering at the scene does not substitute for the required contemporaneous perception of the injury-producing event.
Analysis:
This decision strictly construes the 'contemporaneous observance' element of the bystander recovery test, creating a bright-line rule that limits liability. It clarifies that witnessing the immediate, horrific aftermath of an accident is legally insufficient for recovery; the plaintiff must perceive the accident itself. This holding prevents a potential expansion of bystander liability and provides a clearer, albeit harsher, standard for future cases, reinforcing that the cause of action is for the shock of witnessing the event, not the grief of learning about it or seeing its consequences.
