Ungar v. Sarafite
376 U.S. 575 (1964)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause does not require a judge to be disqualified from presiding over a post-trial criminal contempt hearing merely because the contempt involved disobedience to the judge's orders and criticism of the judge's rulings, unless the judge has become personally embroiled in the conflict or the remarks constitute a vicious personal attack carrying a strong potential for bias.
Facts:
- Ungar, a lawyer, was a hostile prosecution witness in the criminal trial of Hulan Jack, presided over by Judge Sarafite.
- Throughout his testimony, Ungar was unresponsive, wrangled with the prosecutor, and volunteered testimony, despite Judge Sarafite's repeated instructions to simply answer the questions asked.
- In chambers, Judge Sarafite admonished Ungar to confine his answers and warned that he would be held to the natural consequences of his acts.
- On the third day of his testimony, Ungar refused to answer a question, claiming he was being 'pressured and coerced' by the court.
- When Judge Sarafite refused to let him leave the witness stand, Ungar stated: 'I am absolutely unfit to testify because of your Honor’s attitude and conduct towards me. I am being coerced and intimidated and badgered. The Court is suppressing the evidence.'
- Judge Sarafite immediately characterized Ungar's conduct as 'contemptuous but disorderly and insolent.'
- After a recess, Ungar claimed to have received medical assistance and was deemed competent to testify, which he did for another day without further incident.
Procedural Posture:
- Two days after the Hulan Jack trial concluded, Judge Sarafite had a show-cause order for a criminal contempt hearing served on Ungar.
- At the hearing five days later, Judge Sarafite, presiding, denied Ungar's motion for a continuance.
- Ungar’s counsel was permitted to withdraw, and Judge Sarafite proceeded with the hearing, finding Ungar guilty of criminal contempt.
- The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, an intermediate appellate court, dismissed Ungar’s appeal.
- The New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutional claims.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require a judge to be disqualified from presiding over a post-trial criminal contempt hearing when the contempt charge is based on the defendant's disruptive conduct and accusations that the judge was 'coercing' him and 'suppressing the evidence'?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
No. The Due Process Clause does not require disqualification in this case because the witness's remarks did not constitute a personal attack sufficient to create a likelihood of bias. The Court reasoned that judges are presumed capable of fairly and impartially dealing with resistance to their authority and criticism of their rulings. Ungar's commentary, while 'disruptive, recalcitrant and disagreeable,' was not an 'insulting attack upon the integrity of the judge' that would require disqualification under precedents like Offutt v. United States. The record did not show that the judge became 'personally embroiled' with Ungar; rather, the conflict stemmed from Ungar's resistance to judicial authority. Furthermore, the denial of a continuance did not violate due process because the five days' notice was sufficient for a straightforward contempt case, and the trial judge's decision was not arbitrary.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes. Due process required a different judge to preside over the contempt trial because the trial judge became 'personally embroiled' with the witness and prejudged his guilt. The dissent argued that Ungar's accusation that 'The Court is suppressing the evidence' was a direct charge of judicial malfeasance, constituting a personal attack. More importantly, the judge had already announced his decision on the issue of guilt before the hearing by immediately declaring Ungar 'contemptuous' and by concluding he was 'malingering' (faking his emotional distress) on the record. Allowing a judge who has already expressed a firm opinion on guilt to preside over the trial is a 'travesty on American justice.'
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Goldberg
Yes. The contempt should have been tried before a different judge. This dissent focused on the limits of a court's contempt power, arguing that summary punishment is only constitutionally permissible when an 'open threat to the orderly procedure of the court' requires instant suppression. Since the contempt hearing occurred after the trial had concluded, there was no need for immediate action. Therefore, a full hearing satisfying due process, which includes a trial before an unbiased judge, was required. Given the personal nature of the charges against the judge, he should have been disqualified.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Harlan
No. The procedure was constitutional and, in fact, afforded Ungar more due process than was required. The concurrence agrees with the majority but adds that under the precedent of Sacher v. United States, the judge had the constitutional authority to hold Ungar in contempt summarily at the conclusion of the trial without any hearing at all. By providing a post-trial hearing with five days' notice, the judge gave Ungar more procedural protection than he was constitutionally owed.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the high threshold for judicial disqualification due to bias in criminal contempt proceedings. It establishes that a contemnor's disruptive behavior and accusations against the court, short of a deeply personal and insulting attack, are generally insufficient to mandate recusal under the Due Process Clause. The decision reinforces the principle that judges are expected to withstand challenges to their authority without becoming personally biased, thereby making it more difficult for a party to force a judge's recusal through their own misconduct. This precedent distinguishes between mere 'disagreeable commentary' and the kind of personal embroilment or attack on a judge's integrity that compromises the appearance and reality of an impartial tribunal.
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