United States of America v. Derrick Lance Blackman
904 F.2d 1250 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
Under U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1, a defendant's use of an alias at the time of arrest constitutes an attempt to obstruct justice warranting a two-level sentence enhancement, regardless of whether the attempt actually misled or prejudiced the government.
Facts:
- Between May 10 and 12, 1988, an anonymous informant called the Kansas City Police Department with information about Derrick Lance Blackman's drug trafficking activities.
- The informant stated Blackman would arrive via Amtrak from Los Angeles with cocaine, described his appearance, and provided details about his truck, an associated business, and aliases he used.
- Police corroborated several key details from the tip, including the existence and location of the truck (registered to an alias), the existence of a wheel rim shop in California, and Blackman's identity through the Los Angeles Police Department.
- On May 13, 1988, police observed Blackman, who matched the informant's description and a police photograph, disembark from an Amtrak train arriving from Los Angeles and enter a taxi.
- After police stopped the taxi, Blackman identified himself with a California driver's license bearing the alias 'Donald Summers' and falsely denied having any luggage.
- Prior to his arrest, Blackman had conducted several financial transactions under aliases, including wiring over $11,000 to California and paying an auto dealership approximately $4,000 to create sham paperwork to transfer title of his truck to another alias.
Procedural Posture:
- Derrick Lance Blackman was charged in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and five counts of money laundering.
- Blackman filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence from the luggage search and statements made at arrest, which the district court denied.
- Following a trial, a jury found Blackman guilty on all counts.
- The district court, relying on the Presentence Report, increased Blackman's base offense level by two points for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for using an alias.
- The district court sentenced Blackman to 25 years on the drug count and 5 years concurrently on the money laundering counts.
- Blackman, as the appellant, appealed the final judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's use of an alias at the time of arrest constitute an attempt to obstruct justice warranting a two-level sentence enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1, even if the authorities already know the defendant's true identity and are not actually impeded?
Opinions:
Majority - McMillian, J.
Yes. A defendant's use of an alias qualifies for a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice under Guideline § 3C1.1, regardless of whether the authorities were actually foiled by the false identification. The guideline specifically encompasses an 'attempt' to impede or obstruct justice, and therefore no finding of actual prejudice to the government is required. The court also held that under the totality of the circumstances, the corroborated informant's tip provided probable cause for the police to stop the taxi and seize the luggage under the automobile exception. Finally, sufficient circumstantial evidence—including expert testimony on drug traffickers' methods and Blackman's lack of legitimate income—supported the money laundering convictions without needing to trace the money to a specific drug sale.
Dissenting - Heaney, Sr. J.
No. The sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice should not apply because Blackman's conduct was not a 'material' falsehood and had no effect on the investigation. The authorities knew Blackman's identity and aliases at the time of his arrest, making his attempt to conceal his identity futile and immaterial. Applying a two-level enhancement, which added over five years to his sentence, for such an innocuous act is disproportionate and stretches the meaning of 'willfully obstructing or impeding proceedings' beyond its reasonable limits. This broad interpretation treats a futile lie the same as threatening a witness, which is contrary to the guidelines' goal of proportionality in sentencing.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 focuses on the defendant's intent and actions, not the outcome. By holding that an 'attempt' is sufficient, the court lowers the evidentiary bar for prosecutors, who do not need to prove that an investigation was actually hindered or delayed. This precedent expands the scope of conduct punishable under the guideline, potentially leading to more frequent enhancements for acts like giving a false name at arrest. The dissent's strong opposition highlights the tension between a literal reading of the guideline's text ('attempt') and the principle of proportionality in sentencing.
