Tyner v. State
805 So. 2d 862, 2001 WL 1042528 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant can be properly convicted of DUI-related offenses based on evidence of an unlawful blood alcohol level presented under common law evidentiary rules, even if the statutory presumption of impairment from the implied consent law is not used and the jury is instructed on alternative theories of DUI, including the strict liability theory of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level.
Facts:
- Stephen Tyner operated a vehicle.
- Stephen Tyner's operation of the vehicle caused or contributed to the cause of death of Malina Bos.
- Stephen Tyner's operation of the vehicle caused property damage.
- Stephen Tyner had a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher at the time of the incident.
Procedural Posture:
- Stephen Tyner was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol/manslaughter (DUI manslaughter) and DUI causing property damage.
- Prior to trial, Stephen Tyner filed a motion to suppress, or in the alternative, a motion in limine to exclude his blood alcohol test results due to the inadequacy of FDLE rules regarding the collection and storage of blood samples.
- The trial judge denied Stephen Tyner's motion.
- At trial, the State chose to introduce Stephen Tyner's blood alcohol evidence in accord with the common law three-prong predicate from Robertson v. State, rather than utilizing the implied consent law's presumption of impairment.
- The trial judge instructed the jury that to find Stephen Tyner guilty of DUI manslaughter, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a vehicle, caused Malina Bos's death, and at the time of operation was under the influence to the extent his normal faculties were impaired or had a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher.
- Stephen Tyner was convicted of DUI manslaughter and DUI causing property damage.
- Stephen Tyner, as appellant, appealed his judgment and sentence to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, with the State of Florida as appellee.
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Issue:
Does a conviction for DUI manslaughter and DUI causing property damage stand when the State introduces blood alcohol test results via the common law Robertson predicate (without using the implied consent law's presumption of impairment) and the jury is instructed on the alternative theories for DUI, including the strict liability theory of having an unlawful blood alcohol level?
Opinions:
Majority - Campbell, Senior Judge
Yes, the conviction for DUI manslaughter and DUI causing property damage stands because the State properly admitted evidence of Stephen Tyner's blood alcohol level through common law scientific methods, and the jury was correctly instructed on the alternative theories of DUI, including the strict liability theory of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level, without relying on the statutory presumption of impairment. The court affirmed Tyner's conviction, disagreeing with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's holding in Dodge v. State, which found a nearly identical jury instruction to be improper. The court reasoned that Florida law, specifically section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1995), provides two alternative theories for DUI offenses: (1) actual impairment (where normal faculties are impaired) or (2) a strict liability theory based solely on a blood or breath alcohol level of 0.08% or higher, historically known as Driving with an Unlawful Blood Alcohol Level (DUBAL). The State explicitly chose to introduce Tyner's blood alcohol evidence using the three-prong common law predicate from Robertson v. State, rather than relying on the statutory presumption of impairment created by the implied consent law. Since the jury was instructed on these alternative theories, including the strict liability DUBAL offense, and the State met its burden to prove Tyner operated a motor vehicle with an unlawful blood alcohol level through properly admitted evidence, the conviction was valid. The court cited State v. Rolle and Robertson v. State to underscore the long-standing recognition of these distinct theories of DUI proof.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the distinct legal theories available to the State for proving a DUI offense in Florida, emphasizing that driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level (DUBAL) is a strict liability offense separate from impairment, and can be proven even when the statutory presumption of impairment from the implied consent law is not utilized. By explicitly rejecting the Dodge court's reasoning, this decision provides crucial guidance for trial courts and prosecutors on how to admit blood alcohol evidence and instruct juries, particularly in scenarios where challenges to the implied consent statutory presumptions arise. The ruling reinforces that DUI convictions can be sustained if sufficient evidence of an unlawful blood alcohol level is admitted through common law evidentiary standards, thereby preventing automatic reversal of convictions solely due to the non-application of statutory presumptions.
