Tymshare, Inc. v. William J. Covell. William J. Covell v. Tymshare, Inc
1 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 613, 234 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 727 F.2d 1145 (1984)
Rule of Law:
Even when a contract explicitly grants one party 'sole discretion' to modify terms, this discretion is implicitly limited by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, preventing its use to retroactively deprive the other party of a central compensatory benefit contemplated by the agreement.
Facts:
- William Covell, a resident of Maryland, began working for Tymshare, a California corporation selling data processing services, in 1978.
- Covell's compensation plan included a salary plus commissions on sales exceeding designated annual sales quotas.
- In 1979, Tymshare won a major contract to provide data processing services to the United States Postal Service, allegedly due in substantial part to Covell’s sales efforts.
- At the beginning of 1980, Covell’s sales quota was set at $1.2 million, based significantly on expected revenues from the Postal Service contract.
- By spring 1980, the Postal Service’s conversion to Tymshare’s system was slower than planned, leading Tymshare to reduce Covell’s quota to $815,000.
- In autumn 1980, revenues from the Postal Service contract increased dramatically, exceeding Covell’s revised quota; by the end of November, his commissions alone already exceeded $30,000.
- Tymshare subsequently withheld Covell's September and October commission checks, and on December 1, he was told not to return to work.
- On December 9, Tymshare presented Covell with a revised quota plan, retroactively adjusting his annual target upward to the original $1.2 million, primarily by raising his November quota, which effectively erased his year-to-date surplus.
- Tymshare terminated Covell’s employment contract on December 20, 1980.
Procedural Posture:
- William Covell sued Tymshare, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, asserting counts for breach of contract based on Tymshare's failure to exercise discretion in good faith, discharge in breach of contract, and wrongful discharge.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for Covell on the first count, finding that Tymshare demonstrated bad faith and arbitrary action, and awarded $31,173.32 in compensatory damages.
- The parties subsequently filed a joint motion to dismiss Covell's remaining claims (Counts II and III) and Tymshare's counterclaim (for breach of a nondisclosure agreement) with prejudice.
- Tymshare appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Covell to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (appellant, No. 82-2218).
- Covell cross-appealed the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest (cross-appellant, No. 82-2237).
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Issue:
Does a contractual provision granting an employer 'sole discretion' to modify an employee's sales quota permit retroactive alterations implemented with the purpose of reducing an employee's already substantially earned commissions, thereby violating the implied covenant of good faith performance?
Opinions:
Majority - Scalia, Circuit Judge
No, a contractual provision granting an employer 'sole discretion' to modify an employee's sales quota does not permit retroactive alterations implemented with the purpose of reducing an employee's already substantially earned commissions if such action is not for purposes implicitly envisioned by the contract. The court first acknowledged that the contract, governed by Virginia law, does permit retroactive quota adjustments in some circumstances. The language in the Compensation Plan stating that 'management reserves the right to change... individual quota and reserve payments at any time during the quota year within their sole discretion' is broad, and the system of monthly quotas (which are merely estimates of annual compensation, with 'true earned incentives... not known until year end') suggests flexibility. Tymshare had also made such adjustments in the past. However, the court rejected Tymshare's assertion that 'sole discretion' means an unfettered right to act 'for any reason whatsoever, no matter how arbitrary or unreasonable.' The doctrine of good faith performance, though sometimes seen as a modern development, is essentially a 'rechristening of fundamental principles of contract law' and a mechanism for identifying an 'implied obligation not to engage in the particular form of conduct which... constitutes 'bad faith'.' Citing Carpenter v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., the court noted that even powers contingent on 'satisfactory use' implicitly require fair action, not action for ulterior motives like seeking better terms elsewhere. The court differentiated between express contractual powers that are implicitly absolute (like the power to call a demand note) and those that are not (like the power to terminate certain continuing contractual arrangements). When a power, even if accompanied by expansive modifiers like 'sole discretion,' concerns a 'central compensatory element of the contract — a large part of the quid pro quo that induced one party’s assent,' it is unlikely the parties intended such an absolute power. Instead, 'sole discretion' in this context is reasonably understood to be discretion to determine the existence of factors that would genuinely and reasonably justify altering the sales quota (e.g., unanticipated high volume from a customer not due to the employee's efforts, or a poor overall company sales year), not discretion to reduce a quota simply to deprive an employee of reasonably expected compensation. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment because, while the district court found a 'reasonable management judgment' for the quota increase and noted that retroactive application would normally not affect total commission unless employment was terminated, it did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Tymshare possessed the intent to terminate Covell at the time the retroactive quota increase was effected. Such an inference of intent is not 'inevitable' and thus inappropriate for summary judgment, requiring further factual determination. The court also clarified that its decision did not address other potential claims, such as wrongful termination.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the limits of broadly worded 'sole discretion' clauses within employment contracts, particularly regarding compensation. It establishes that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not an external moral overlay but an intrinsic part of contract interpretation, requiring courts to discern the reasonable expectations and implicit purposes underlying contractual powers. The ruling reinforces that such discretionary powers cannot be exercised arbitrarily or for the purpose of denying a party the core benefits they reasonably anticipated from the agreement. Future cases will likely scrutinize the employer's intent and the legitimate business justifications behind the exercise of discretionary powers that impact employee compensation, providing greater protection for employees against opportunistic modifications to their earning potential.
