Ty v. GMA Accessories
132 F.3d 1167 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Access and copying may be inferred when two works are so strikingly similar to each other, and not to anything in the public domain, that it is highly probable the creator of the second work copied the first; this inference can be rebutted by evidence of independent creation.
Facts:
- In 1993, Ty, Inc. began selling its popular 'Beanie Babies' line of stuffed animals, which included a pig named 'Squealer'.
- Three years later, GMA Accessories, Inc. introduced its own line of bean-bag stuffed animals.
- GMA's line included a pig named 'Preston' and a cow named 'Louie'.
- GMA's 'Preston' pig is strikingly similar in appearance to Ty's copyrighted 'Squealer' pig.
- Similarly, GMA's 'Louie' the Cow is nearly identical to Ty's copyrighted 'Daisy' the Cow.
- Neither 'Preston' nor 'Squealer' bears a significant resemblance to a real pig or any other pig figure in the public domain.
- GMA's designer, Janet Salmon, submitted an initial design drawing for 'Preston' that resembled Ty's 'Squealer' less than the final manufactured product did.
Procedural Posture:
- Ty, Inc. sued GMA Accessories, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for copyright infringement.
- Ty filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent GMA from selling its 'Preston the Pig' and 'Louie the Cow' toys.
- The district court (trial court) granted the preliminary injunction in favor of Ty.
- GMA Accessories, Inc. (appellant) appealed the portion of the injunction regarding 'Preston the Pig' to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with Ty, Inc. as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a striking similarity between a copyrighted work and an allegedly infringing work, where neither resembles anything in the public domain, create a rebuttable inference of access and copying sufficient to support a preliminary injunction?
Opinions:
Majority - Posner, Chief Judge
Yes. A striking similarity between two works that are not similar to anything in the public domain is sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a rebuttable inference of access and copying. The court reasoned that copyright law forbids copying, not independent creation that happens to be identical. However, similarity can be powerful evidence of copying. When two works are so alike that coincidence is improbable, the court may infer that the creator of the second work had access to the first. This inference is strongest when the works are dissimilar to anything in the public domain, such as a real animal. Here, GMA's 'Preston' pig was strikingly similar to Ty's 'Squealer' but not to a real pig. GMA's evidence of independent creation—an affidavit from the designer—was weak because it only pertained to her initial drawing, which was less similar to 'Squealer' than the final manufactured product. The fact that GMA had clearly copied Ty's cow further supported the inference that it also had access to and copied the pig. Finally, Ty demonstrated irreparable harm by showing that GMA's infringement disrupted its unique marketing and distribution strategy, a harm not easily compensable with monetary damages.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the evidentiary standard for proving copyright infringement through circumstantial evidence in the Seventh Circuit. It establishes that 'striking similarity' can be so powerful that it serves as proof of both access and copying, especially when the copied work is distinctive from public domain sources. This lowers the burden on plaintiffs who may not have direct evidence of access but can show a near-identical copy. The decision reinforces a probabilistic approach to infringement, allowing courts to infer copying from a set of circumstances that make independent creation highly unlikely.
