Twohig v. Briner
214 Cal.Rptr. 729, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 2172 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
A vehicle owner has a common law duty to exercise due care for the safety of passengers, and a triable issue of fact as to whether this duty was breached arises when the owner removes manufacturer-installed seat belts from the vehicle.
Facts:
- Janet Briner owned and operated a 1970 Volkswagen automobile.
- Candace Twohig alleged that Briner told her the vehicle's seat belts had been removed after Briner purchased the car.
- Twohig was a passenger in the front seat of Briner's vehicle.
- While Twohig was a passenger, there were no seat belts available for her use.
- The vehicle was involved in a two-car collision.
- Twohig sustained personal injuries during the collision.
- Briner may not have been at fault in causing the initial collision.
Procedural Posture:
- Candace Twohig sued Janet Briner in a California trial court for personal injuries.
- The complaint alleged Briner was negligent in the operation and maintenance of her automobile by removing or failing to install seat belts.
- Briner filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing she had no legal duty to provide seat belts.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Briner.
- Twohig, the plaintiff-appellant, appealed the grant of summary judgment to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a vehicle owner's removal of manufacturer-installed seat belts from an automobile create a triable issue of fact as to whether the owner breached the common law duty to exercise due care for the safety of passengers?
Opinions:
Majority - Work, Acting P. J.
Yes. A vehicle owner's removal of manufacturer-installed seat belts creates a triable issue of fact as to whether the owner breached the common law duty of due care. The court reasoned that the issue is not whether a statute requires an owner to provide seat belts, but whether removing an existing safety device breaches the general duty to maintain a vehicle in a reasonably safe condition. Given the common knowledge that seat belts prevent 'second collision' injuries, it is foreseeable that removing them increases the danger to passengers. This foreseeability of harm means a jury should determine whether the act of removing the belts constituted negligence, even if a third party caused the initial accident.
Concurring - Lewis, J.
Yes. While agreeing that the case should be decided by a jury, the concurrence disagrees with the majority's suggestion in a footnote that removing seat belts constitutes negligence as a matter of law. Instead, the jury should be permitted to consider all relevant evidence, such as the condition of the seat belts before removal or whether passengers typically used them, to determine whether the owner's conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances. The question of negligence should be a factual determination for the jury, not a legal conclusion by the court.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the absence of a specific statutory duty to provide seat belts does not absolve a vehicle owner of liability under common law negligence principles. The court shifts the focus from a duty to provide equipment to the duty not to remove existing safety features, thereby making the vehicle less safe. This precedent establishes that an affirmative act that increases the risk of harm to passengers can be a breach of the duty of due care, opening the door for negligence claims based on the removal or disabling of other standard vehicle safety equipment.
