Twining v. New Jersey
211 U.S. 78 (1908)
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Rule of Law:
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is not a fundamental right of national citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, nor is it an essential element of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause against state action.
Facts:
- Albert C. Twining and David C. Cornell were directors of the Monmouth Trust and Safe Deposit Company in New Jersey.
- Twining and Cornell were indicted on charges of knowingly exhibiting a false paper to a state bank examiner with the intent to deceive him as to the financial condition of the company.
- At their criminal trial, both Twining and Cornell exercised their right not to testify.
- In his instructions to the jury, the trial judge commented on the defendants' failure to take the stand, stating that the jury could draw an unfavorable inference from their refusal to deny the incriminating evidence presented by the state.
Procedural Posture:
- Twining and Cornell were indicted and tried in the New Jersey Court of Quarter Sessions, a trial court.
- Following a jury trial, both defendants were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.
- The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, an intermediate appellate court, which affirmed the convictions.
- The defendants then appealed to the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, the state's highest court at the time, which also affirmed the judgments.
- The defendants obtained a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to review the final judgment of the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a state law permitting a jury to draw an unfavorable inference from a criminal defendant's failure to testify in his own defense violate the defendant's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Moody
No, a state law allowing an adverse inference from a defendant's silence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, nor is it a fundamental component of due process of law that applies to the states. The court reasoned, first, that under the precedent of the Slaughter-House Cases, the Privileges or Immunities Clause only protects rights inherent in national citizenship, and the right against self-incrimination is a matter of state law. Second, analyzing the Due Process Clause, the court conducted a historical review and concluded that the privilege against self-incrimination was not part of the 'law of the land' in Magna Carta and developed later as a rule of evidence. It is not a 'fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government,' and therefore, its absence does not deny due process. States are thus free to define and regulate this privilege in their own courts.
Dissenting - Justice Harlan
Yes, a state law permitting an adverse inference from a defendant's silence violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Immunity from self-incrimination is both a fundamental privilege of national citizenship that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from abridging and an essential element of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause. Justice Harlan argued that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to apply the protections of the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, to the states. He asserted that compelling a person to incriminate himself is 'abhorrent to the instincts of an American' and contrary to the principles of a free government, making it fundamentally inconsistent with the concept of due process of law.
Analysis:
This decision established that the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination was not incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. It heavily reinforced the narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause from the Slaughter-House Cases, limiting its scope to rights of national citizenship. While the Court would later engage in 'selective incorporation' of other Bill of Rights protections, Twining's holding that the self-incrimination clause was not 'fundamental' enough for due process protection stood for over 50 years until it was expressly overturned by Malloy v. Hogan (1964) and Griffin v. California (1965).
